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PREFACE
This dissertation is the culmination of an ongoing
interest in the two philosophers who are its subject. As a
child, I knew of John Dewey as the man who had something to
do with the plan of the elementary education that I experienced in Oak Park, Illinois. Later, at the University of
Chicago, I had many friends who were the "products" of the
Laboratory School, and although we never thought we might be
influenced by Dewey, we discovered surprisingly mutual ways
of thinking and living as students. Later, as a student at a
British teacher training college, I amazed myself and others
by the chauvinism with which I defended "Deweyan" ideas of
education in a democracy. At the same time, I also enthusiastically embraced and later applied in my own teaching
project method in an integrated curriculum, even though
unaware that the "new" techniques owed much to Dewey's ideas
as manifested by William Heard Kilpatrick.
In 1985, I began graduate study in the Philosophy
Department at Loyola University of Chicago with a view to
concentrating on applied ethics. studying ancient, classical
modern, and modern analytic philosophy with little or no
previous background was arduous, but I began my second year
with a course on John Dewey, during which reading his Quest
for Certainty put my own struggles with "moral theory" in
iii

perspective. I also discovered that understanding different
"philosophies" was made easier by comparing and contrasting
common themes found in the work of any two philosophers.
Thus,

I

wrote about such things as autonomy in Kant and

Rawls and, for a course on the topic of virtue mounted by
Thomas Wren from the Philosophy Department and Walter
Krolikowski from the School of Education, virtue in Aristotle and Rawls. Still pursuing my interest in applied ethics,
I wrote for that first Dewey course a piece on "Work as
Art," the philosophical underpinnings of which drew heavily
on Aristotle in support of John Dewey's views on work in a
technological society.
During my second year of graduate study, I registered
for a philosophy of education course with Fr. Krolikowski,
first, in order to bone up on Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey for
my master's oral to complete the general program in philosophy; second, in order to get a better taste of Dewey, whose
views were compelling; and, finally, in order to have the
opportunity to work with Walter Krolikowski. It was over
coffee after one of those classes that one of us said to the
other -- neither Fr. Krolikowski nor I can recall which of
us it was -- "Dewey is really very Aristotelian," to which
the other replied, simply, "Yes." Two years later,

I

completed the Philosophy Department's master's program in
applied ethics with a paper on virtue in Dewey and Aristotle, produced in another of Fr. Krolikowski's courses for
iv

which we read both the 1908 and the 1932 editions of James
TUfts' and John Dewey's Ethics. I then entered the doctoral
program in the School of Education's Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies with a concentration in
the philosophy of education. My interest in applied ethics
continues, as, after all, at the end of Chapter 24 in
pemocracy and Education, John Dewey did assert "that
philosophy is the theory of education as a deliberately
conducted practice."
As I said at the beginning of this Preface, my
interest in Dewey and Aristotle is ongoing, and this
dissertation represents to me one culmination, that is, an
"end-in-view" of formal academic study.

v
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to show that John
Dewey's 1932 Ethicsl is Aristotelian. I will try to establish that Dewey's thought is congruent or consistent with
that of Aristotle, in particular, with Aristotle's thought
as found in the Nicomachean Ethics.

Primary source
The subject matter in this work will concentrate on
the 200-odd pages that make up Dewey's share of a revised
text he wrote with James H. Tufts. Dewey and Tufts wrote the
original edition in 1906, but, as will be seen, their
separate contributions can easily be distinguished by the
organization of both editions. This dissertation will not
deal with Tufts' material nor will it speculate on whether
the close collaboration of the two men might have resulted
in some overlap of their ideas, whichever one actually
happened to express them.
1 The edition I will be using is the twenty-seventh
volume of The Collected Works of John Dewey. 1882-1953, ed.
Jo Ann Boydston, The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 7: 1932,
Introduction by Abraham Edel and Elizabeth Flower (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985). The form of
footnote reference will be: Dewey, 1932 Ethics.
1

2

While there will be occasional reference to the 1908
Ethics, this dissertation is in no way intended to compare
Dewey's views in the two works. A note by Abraham Edel and
Elizabeth Flower in the Introduction to the definitive
edition of the 1932 Ethics to the effect that such an
undertaking "is at least complex enough for post-doctoral
research, 11 2 somewhat piqued my interest, but not enough to
engage in such a study.

Secondary sources
There is a vast amount of secondary reference
material on Aristotle and on Dewey. It is also easy enough
to find material, both in the field of education and in the
field of philosophy, that refers to the work of both men. In
the area of ethics, however, while there is an abundance of
secondary sources on Aristotle, there is much less on Dewey.
Discussions of Dewey's thought on ethics refer to a great
number of his writings; they rarely refer to those works
entitled Ethics. Further, what few references there are deal
almost exclusively with the 1908 edition.3

2 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. viii.
3 Except for Darnell Rucker's article, "Dewey's Ethics"
in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), and
excerpts in James Gouinlock, The Moral Writings of John
Dewey (New York: Macmillan, 1976), I have gleaned only one
further reference to the 1932 Ethics, a note in J.E. Tiles,
Dewey (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 231.

3

There are three possible reasons for the paucity of
references to the 1932 Ethics. First, the 1908 Ethics was
written as a textbook, and, as such, scholars may be less
likely to take notice of a joint effort by Dewey and Tufts.
second, although the revision in 1932 was almost total, the
Ethics was still only a cowritten textbook and received the
attention of only six reviewers.4 Although it remained in
print until 1952, scholars seemingly did not consider it a
fruitful source of Dewey's ideas. Finally, there is the
matter of "fashion." Dewey has been out of fashion in
philosophy, if not in education. Ethics has been out of
fashion in education, if not in philosophy. Both Dewey and
ethics are becoming fashionable again, and it is just my
good fortune to have picked a field, in both topic and
primary source, that is relatively unplowed.

Philosophical systems of Dewey and Aristotle
This study is not a discussion of the systems
developed by each philosopher. Irwin argues that "Aristotle
changes his mind on some fundamental issues about the nature
df his argument .•. [even though] his later works develop
views that are connected enough to count as systematic."5
4 See Bibliography. The SIU Press' definitive edition
of the 1932 Ethics, [LW: 7) in The Collected Works of John
Dewey was reviewed by Darnell Rucker, Journal of Social
Philosophy, Volume XVII, Number 3 Fall 1987, pp. 64-66.
5 Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 480.

4

something very similar may be true of Dewey, as Horace
Kallen says;
•.. if you wanted Dewey to state a system, he'd have
to contradict himself. He'd have to set up a number
of fixed points and a structural order of the
universe, and deny practically all the fundamental
concepts with which he is identified. He thinks the
functional thoughts, and he writes the functional
thoughts. And it doesn't matter what field you enter
into .•. all [of those other fields] turn on the fact
that they want to use rigidities, to deny process.6
well, then, the two philosophers do not seem to have an
overall system of philosophy. Do they each have a systematic
ethical theory?
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle provides a "most
detailed analysis of Greek attitudes and aspirations,
modified and criticized from his own point of view."7 His
philosophical approach is the method of dialectic brought to
bear on any issue, including the moral life. John Dewey
maintains:
No fundamental difference exists between systematic
moral theory ••• and the reflection an individual
engages in when he attempts to find general principles which shall direct and justify his conduct.a
It seems, then, that each philosopher has a way of
going about ethical decision-making, but, as indicated and
6 Corliss Lamont, ed., Dialogue on John Dewey (New
York: Horizon Press, 1959), pp. 51-52.
7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Terence Irwin, tr.
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), p. xi. This translation will
be my primary source but other translators will be indicated
when used. All references to the works of Aristotle will be
by Bekker numbers which are standard in all translations.
8 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 163.

5

as we will see further, neither has a "prescriptive" set of
rules about what one ought and ought not do. Morton White is
critical of what he believes is an attempt by Dewey to
derive normative ethical statements from descriptive ones
making an "ought" from an "is" -- but White is mistaken;9
Dewey does no such thing. In fact, the "moral theory" of
either philosopher is beyond easy access by analytic
methods. Rather, the entire structures of Aristotle's and
Dewey's ethics need to be examined to determine if there are
any points of similarity. Those points can then be presented
for further comparison and discussion.

A structuralist approach
What I propose is not so much a method of analyzing
the ethics of Aristotle and of John Dewey as a way of
examining and discussing similar points. These points of
similarity overlap in many ways--much as members of a single
human family may resemble one another. A family resemblance
may be as obvious as red hair and freckles, or, less
obvious, the timbre of voice or the tendency to weep with
anger. Some points of resemblance can be traced to genetics
and others to environment. Thus, a structural approach to
ethics must take into consideration not just intellectual
and psychological elements but also biological and physical

9 Morton G. White, "Value and Obligation in Dewey and
Lewis," The Philosophical Review, LVIII, 1949, pp. 321-29.

6

elements, including the variety of actual circumstances in
which both the individual and the society exist.
In brief, the structure of ethics that is examined in
this dissertation is comprised of the activity of human
persons in terms of both society and the individual. All
human activity is informed by the character and conduct of
the individual in and by society, just as the character and
conduct of society is informed by individuals. Further, the
structure of ethics is also comprised of processes or the
operational means by which individuals and society function,
such as Dewey's reflective morality and Aristotle's virtue.
Finally, there are ways of "becoming" by habituation and
approbation, that must be included in the structure of
ethics. None of these elements is inclusive of any other;
some may occasionally be in opposition; but all, and perhaps
some more not presented here, are essential to the whole.
These particular elements have been chosen because they are
each important to any description of human activity, and can
also be identified in both Dewey's and Aristotle's ethics.
My task, then, is to see how all of these elements
contribute to the wholeness of Dewey's and Aristotle's
respective ethical structures, and, if their structures are
sufficiently similar, to argue to the conclusion that
Dewey's 1932 Ethics is Aristotelian.

6

CHAPTER I

COMPARING DEWEY AND ARISTOTLE

An examination of the relation between Aristotle and
John Dewey must begin with a discussion of their works that
are available to us. To attempt a comparison of the ethical
thought of two men whose lives were separated by more than
2000 years is daunting, particularly because, as one
philosopher lived so long ago and the other lived so long,
there is an enormous body of literature that deals with the
thought and ideas of each man. In those works concerned with
John Dewey, there are many tantalizing references to
Aristotle {occasionally, by contemporary writers, the other
way around). In Chapter II, I will call upon many of the
biographers of and the commentators on Dewey's life and
thought to attempt a case for Dewey's Aristotelianism. This
chapter deals with the works of my two protagonists and with
narrowing the focus to Dewey's ethical theory in the 1932
Ethics. Such a narrow focus cannot be attempted with regard
to Aristotle. Although the Nicomachean Ethics does provide
the substantial points of reference, it is the Politics that
provides the "proving ground" for Aristotle's ethical theory
as part of a larger political science.l
1 Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, p. 24.
7

8

Review of the literature
The reference material for this dissertation can be
found in the bibliography. A number of these sources will be
quoted, and these references also will be found in the
footnotes. I would like, however, to call attention to the
definitive edition of John Dewey's work published by the
Dewey Center in Carbondale and Southern Illinois University
Press under the editorship of Dr. Jo Ann Boydston.2 The
Collected Works of John Dewey consists of five volumes of
the Early Works, fifteen volumes of the Middle Works, and,
when completed, sixteen volumes of the Later Works. All
volumes have excellent introductions by contemporary
philosophers and educators. Access to such a collection
makes the writing task much easier and provides the necessary reference support for several works of biography
titled, simply, John Dewey.
In another work, titled simply Aristotle, 3 John
Herman Randall asks many more questions than he answers,
but, in doing so, he makes some intriguing references to
John Dewey. 4 Randall also reminds us that Aristotle's work
2 References to volumes other than the 1908 and 1932
Ethics in this Collected Works edition will take the short
form [MW: 5), and accompany references to earlier editions.
3 John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1960).
4 Ibid. Referring to the different forms and versions
of Aristotle's thought, Randall says 11 • • • it appears quite as
useless to attempt to harmonize all the writings [of
Aristotle] ... as to endeavor to harmonize, say, the early

9

is fragmentary and repetitious.5 While the latter part of
this description may in fact be applied to John Dewey, his
work is by no means fragmentary -- we have it all -- from
1882 to 1953.

The works of Aristotle
Unlike Dewey's work that was written, or rather
typed, by the author and published in his lifetime,
Aristotle's work has come to us in the form of brief
treatises and lecture notes, taken down and copied first by
his students, and arranged, preserved, and rearranged into
the form that was finally settled in the nineteenth century.
There is no need to enter into a discussion of which works
are more or less "Aristotelian" than others.
Not all of the Aristotelian concepts to which I refer
come from the Nicomachean Ethics. That is, when Aristotle
says that thus and so is the case in the Ethics, it often
will be necessary to refer to another treatise, such as the
Politics or Posterior Analytics to discover what he says
about

~

thus and so comes to be the case. In addition, and

although I rarely quote him, Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on

Hegelian writings of John Dewey with Experience and Nature
and his subsequent books." p. 27.
5 Aristotle himself makes reference to digression in
his account at ~' 1095bl4.

10
~he Nichomachean Ethics 6 has helped me clarify some of my

own thinking about Aristotle.

The works of John Dewey
While this paper deals specifically with Dewey's
ethical theory in the 1932 Ethics, it is still necessary to
place that work in the context of Dewey's corpus of philosophical and social thought. Between 1925 and 1934, Dewey
entered the seventh decade of his life and retired from
full-time teaching at Columbia. During this time, he also
reached what some have considered the "height of his powers
and influence." 7

He gave lectures and speeches, wrote

literally hundreds of essays and articles, and published
four major works -- Experience and Nature (1925), The Public
and Its Problems (1927), The Quest for Certainty (1929), and
Art as Experience (1934). In addition, he was engaged
sporadically throughout this period in writing LQgic: The
Theory of Inquiry (1938).8 About halfway through this
extraordinarily active period, Dewey also undertook the
6 St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean
Ethics (Chicago: Regnery, 1964).
1 Paul Kurtz, The Collected Works of John Dewey, The
Later Works. 1925-1953 Volume 5: 1929-1930, ed. Jo Ann
Boydston. Introduction by Paul Kurtz (Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1985).

8 Textual Commentary in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry in
The Collected Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The
Later Works. 1925-1953, Volume 12: 1938, Introduction by
Ernest Nagel (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1985), p. 534.

11
revision of the textbook Ethics, which he had originally
written with James H. Tufts in 1908. In 1931, when the
revision was begun, John Dewey had been widowed for five
years and was seventy-two years old.

The 1908 Ethics
Dewey and Tufts had been colleagues at both the
University of Michigan and the University of Chicago. Tufts
remained at Chicago until his retirement in 1930. After
Dewey's move to Columbia University in 1904, the two men
undertook to produce a textbook on ethics, presenting the
ideas they had developed both jointly and independently
during the years at Chicago.9 It was agreed that the work
would be in three parts. Tufts wrote the historical Part I:
The Beginnings and Growth of Morality; Dewey, Part II:
Theory of the Moral Life and the first two chapters of Part
III: The World of Action; and Tufts, the remainder of the
book. Published in 1908, the Ethics became a popular
university textbooklO and was reprinted at least twenty-five
times before 1930.ll

In that year, although it is not clear

9 Textual Commentary, Ethics in The Collected Works of
John oewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, The Middle Works. 189912..2.!, Volume 5: 1908, Introduction by Charles L. Stevenson
(Carbondale: southern Illinois University Press, 1985), pp.
549-550.
10 James T. Farrell recalls using Dewey and TUfts'l908
Ethics as an undergraduate at the University of Chicago in
the early 1920s. Dialogue on John Dewey, p. 131.
11 Textual Commentary, 1908 Ethics, p. 553.

12
what prompted them to do so,12 Tufts and Dewey undertook a
revision of the textbook.

The 1932 Ethics
Tufts made changes in three chapters (1, 3, and 6)
and added an entire new chapter on the Romans (8) in his
first part of the revision. There are still nine chapters in
Part I, but, in addition to the new chapter, what was
Chapter 8 in the 1906 Ethics, "The Modern Period," has been
"almost entirely rewritten" and become Chapter 9 in the 1932
Ethics, "Factors and Trends in the Modern Moral Consciousness.1113 The old Chapter 9, "A General Comparison of
customary and Reflective Morality," no longer appears in the
first part.
Although there is no comment, much less explanation,
in either the Preface to the 1932 Edition or in the
otherwise excellent Textual Commentary as to why this was
done, the topics of customary and reflective morality are
taken up by Dewey in Part II. One can only assume that as
Part II was "recast; the method of presentation ... changed
and the material practically all rewritten,nl4 the two
12 I speculate that this may have been a "retirement
project" for the two men, perhaps planned by Dewey. Tufts
was three years Dewey's junior and apparently ill at about
the time of his retirement (see Textual Commentary, 1932
Ethics, p. 473), but he recovered to write his share of the
text and died in 1942, aged 80.
13 Preface, 1932 Ethics, p. 4.
l4 Ibid.

13
author• agreed to this rearrangement of material from Tufts'
section to Dewey's. In fact, their close collaboration makes
it impossible to distinguish which of them contributed which
ideas in the original arrangement. One can, however, suggest
that these topics more properly belong in a section on the
theory of morality than in the historical section. As for
Part III, the entire section "with the exception of [five]
pages ... is new. 11 15
Part II and the first two chapters of Part III are
Dewey's contribution to the 1932 Ethics and will be the
focus of this dissertation, although some reference will be
made to the 1908 Ethics in support of ideas in the later
work. However, I will not enter into any discussion of the
differences found between the 1908 and 1932 versions, as
there is ample evidence that Dewey revised and rewrote all
the material. The later edition, therefore, can be said to
constitute his considered ideas on ethics as of 1932.

15 Ibid.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

This chapter is an attempt to construct a methodology
for the comparison of Dewey's and Aristotle's ethical
thought. While it cannot be denied that there may be some
similarities in the thinking of these two philosophers, such
similarities cannot be argued solely on the basis of words
used. Neither philosopher, and one did not write in English,
offers examples of applications of moral theory whose
congruency is immediately apparent by comparing terms. Nor
is it possible to argue analogical likeness. That is, even
if

th~

attributes, circumstances, or effects of the moral

"theory" of each philosopher were found to be analogous, it
would also be necessary to consider moral "practice" or the
processes of moral thinking and action in society, which
would require setting up a whole new lot of analogies
because of the vast historical distance between the two
philosophers. Since the matter at hand is to establish
whether Dewey's 1932 Ethics is Aristotelian, one can only
identify.a few points that the two philosophers seem to have
in common and connect those points with processes they
appear to have in common. If the resulting structures of
points and processes are similar, that similarity will
14

15

enable one to argue that it is possible to show that Dewey's
1932

E~hics

is Aristotelian.

For a method with which to compare the ideas of Dewey
and Aristotle, I propose to take Dewey's own method of
inquiry as a general framework. This chapter will offer
material from Stephen Toulmin for specific method, consider
Dewey's view of the places of inductive and deductive
reasoning, and draw on Peter Achinstein for a discussion of
what constitutes evidence and probability. Finally, Dewey's
concept of warranted assertibility will be presented in
support of my methodology.
The objective is to set up a method whereby the
identified points and processes in the structure of ethical
thought of Dewey and of Aristotle can be examined using the
same methodological approach to discover what, if any,
similarities can be found and the extent to which such
structural similarities lead to the confirmation of thesis
of this dissertation.

Dewey's Pattern of Inquiry
The objective of inquiry, according to John Dewey, is
to resolve an indeterminate situation into a unified one.
The first steps are to identify the "problem situation" and
to determine a "problem solution." Reasoning or rational
discourse determines the meaning of the situation, and that
situation's relation to ideas that arise as further hypothe-

16
ses are developed. This operational relation between facts
and meanings can then be subject to methods of common sense
and scientific inquiry depending on subject matter rather
than any basic logical forms or relations.l Propositions
about subject contents or facts thus undergo independent
development just as do propositions about meanings and their
relations. Subject contents can be called material means and
meanings and their relations called procedural means, it
being remembered that both are operational since they are
both means of determining the final situation and judgment.2
Dewey uses the term "relation" to describe the matter
of inquiry, defines it, and redefines it throughout the text
of the Logic. According to Gail Kennedy's rather succinct
summary, there are four key types of relation in inquiry,
connection or involvement, inference, implication, and
reference.3 The first two are existential, the actual
subject matter of the problem situation is connected to the
meaning that may be inferred from that subject matter or
data. The third term, implication, refers to the relation
between the meanings of various data, and the last term
designates the relating or reference of such meanings to
1 Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, The Later Works.
1925-1953, Volume 12: 1938 (Carbondale: southern Illinois
University Press, 1986), [LW: 12] pp. 108-122.
2 Ibid., p. 139.
3 Gail Kennedy, "Dewey's Logic and Theory of Knowledge," in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, pp. 74-75.
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existential subject matter. What inquiry is concerned with
is the threefold correspondence between a relational
structure of data and meanings and a set of inferences
"which in their turn depend upon a complex of brute existential connections or involvements."4 Or, in Dewey's classic
definition of inquiry:
Inquiry is the controlled or direct transformation of
an indeterminate situation into one that is so
determinate in its constituent distinctions and
relations as to convert the elements of the original
situation into a unified whole.5
While this is a summary of what this dissertation sets out
to do, transform points and processes into unified and
comparable structures, Dewey does not really clarify the
steps by which the investigator treats material in the
process of inquiry. For this, one needs to find a more
straightforward method for the undertaking, and I have
chosen the work of Stephen Toulmin exemplify such a method.

Toulmin's method
The thesis of this piece of work makes the assertion
that Dewey's Ethics is Aristotelian. In order to establish
grounds for such an assertion it is necessary to make
certain claims about the similarity or correspondence of
particular concepts and ideas that are common to Dewey and
Aristotle. The method by which I propose to do this in
4 Ibid.
5 Dewey, Logic, [LW: 12] p. 108.
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subsequent chapters will be to follow the pattern or
structure of argument laid out by Toulmin.6
Each chapter will make a claim and data will be
gathered relevant to that claim. Primary data will consist
of "facts," that is, what is actually stated by Dewey and by
Aristotle on specific matters. Secondary data will consist
of what others have said about Dewey's and Aristotle's
statements on these matters. These are the "material means"
of Dewey's pattern of inquiry.
Then, based on these data, I will offer "general,
hypothetical statements, which can act as bridges, and
authorize the particular argument" to which the claim of a
chapter is committed. 7 These "warrants" take the form of
assertions about the data as, for instance, both Dewey and
Aristotle appear to say the same things about the nature of
habit. Warrants also are subject to qualifiers, such as the
difficulty of comparison of the terse clarity of Aristotle's
text to the sometimes convoluted density of Dewey's writing.
Some rebuttals to the warrants also will be pointed out and
argued to some conclusion, generally on the basis of
additional facts that "can serve as further data, or they
can be cited to confirm or rebut the applicability of a

6 Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1964).
7 Toulmin, p. 98.
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warrant."8 Arguing warrants, qualifiers, and rebuttals are
the "procedural means" of Dewey's pattern of inquiry.
Toulmin gives a very compelling argument for the impossibility of making a distinction between "conclusions
[that] can be inferred necessarily or certainly and those
conclusions [that] can be inferred only possibly or with
probability. 11 9 He argues that the attempts of some theorists
to identify analytic arguments with the former and substantial arguments with the latter are unjustified. It seems
appropriate to digress briefly at this point to a short
discussion of formal reasoning and to off er some of John
Dewey's consideration of the matter.

Inductive and deductive reasoning
Dewey says that while our moral judgments are often
intuitive, such intuitive judgment is not due to some
separate faculty of moral insightlO but is the result of
bringing our past experience to bear on the immediate
situation using our ability to reason. In this way we can
form general ideas or principles to "bring ... to deliberation
on particular situations.llusing the material of experience
to discover principles is called inductive reasoning. The
8

Toulmin, p. 102.

9 Toulmin, p. 136.
10 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 266.
11 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 276.
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theory of induction holds that there is an intellectual
process whereby we move from knowledge of particulars to
knowledge of universals. On one theory we perceive essences12 and engage in collective generalization (adding
instances) leading to intellectual principles being grasped
through insight or formed by applying some general principle
of intelligibility to particular instances. Because the
specific and intelligible necessity of connection may not be
apparent, some hold experimental generalization or inductive
argument just probable, unlike syllogistic deductive
argument where a conclusion follows of necessity.
Although perfect induction would involve canvassing
all instances, experimental generalizations may arise out of
connections that are not always reproducible or even
demonstrable, but theoretical repetition may at least
indicate probability. Dewey maintains that the problem is
often one of finding representative cases and, for him, in
fact, one representative instance may be sufficient to
continue inquiry.13
The most important issue for Dewey is to avoid any
inductive/deductive dualism, which, he claims, was a later
historical development when classic syllogistic logic was

12 See a further reference to this in the conclusion of
this chapter.
13 Dewey, Logic, (LW: 12] p. 432.
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found inadequate for the new scientific inquiry. The logic
of deduction, then:
... was supplemented by superimposition of an
inductive logic supposed to formulate the methods
employed in physical investigations. In consequence,
both the so-called deductive and inductive logics
suffered in their own contents.14
In

effect~

both inductive and deductive logic are for Dewey

just one tools of inquiry, and neither constitute the sole
method by which inquiry may be undertaken any more than
inductive logic is the sole means by which contemporary
scientific investigation is undertaken. Although inquiry has
"in our own culture taken on the character of an institution," particularly in the activities of scientists, it is,
in fact, a way of behaving when we encounter a problematic
situation.15 Types of inquiry develop within a matrix of a
particular culture as part of our "common sense" day-to-day
activities. While developing a theory of logic may not be a
common activity of most persons in most cultures, a few,
such as Aristotle, if not Dewey, have attempted it. Logical
forms are, after all, the product of human thought, "constructed during the process of inquiry as means of carrying
out an inquiry. 11 16

14 Ibid., p. 479.
15 Kennedy, "Dewey's Logic ... ," Guide to the Works of
John Dewey, pp. 70-71.
16 Ibid.
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Dewey further maintains that a distinction between
induction and deduction is irrelevant to the processes of
inquiry.
Sagacity in evaluation, scrupulous care in notation
and record, cherishing and development of suggestion,
a keen eye for relevant analogies, tentative
experimentation, physical and imaginative shaping of
material so that it takes the form of a diagrammatic
representation, are all demanded whether the subjectmatter in question is inductive or deductive ••• the
objective is determination of effective existential
data or relevant and effective conceptions.17
Here Dewey is expressing what Toulmin concludes when he says
we "have occasion in practice to classify some arguments as
substantial and conclusive, or as both analytic and tentative.1118 After all, Dewey is not really offering a theory of
logic (in spite of the title of the work), but rather a
theory of inquiry. What is more, inquiry for Dewey is at all
times ultimately existential, even though formal methods of
logic may be used in the process, and Toulmin's statement of
the classification of arguments 1§ practical, and, further,
it is certainly existential in our common sense understanding of everyday life. This tentative view about the present
state of things can be subject to further verification in
the process of inquiry that in turn leads to making a
warranted assertion about the matter. For Dewey such an
assertion represents a conclusive argument with regard to
the solution of the immediate problem situation.
17 Dewey, Logic, [LW: 12] p. 478.
18 Toulmin, p. 137.
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0ewey's Warranted Assertibility.
In this dissertation certain claims are made about
the congruence of Dewey's and Aristotle's ethical theory.
The process of making judgments involves, as Dewey says:
... estimation, appraisal, assigning value to
something: a discrimination as to advantage:
serviceability, fitness for a purpose, enjoyability,
and so on.19
That is, using what Dewey calls the process of inquiry, a
judgement about a claim must somehow take into consideration
all those things that we possibly can determine to be true
about the matter.
The truth of a claim that is asserted as a result of
Dewey's process of inquiry has what he calls "warranted
assertibility. 11

This is more than simply stating something

to be the case, a formulated proposition that this or that
is how we are aware that this or that is so. A perspectival
view is adequate as far as it goes but offers us no way to
determine the truth of a proposition, if our awareness
cannot sufficiently determine how things actually are.
How then can we define "truth"? Dewey uses Charles
Sanders Peirce's coherence definition rather weakly at one
point,20 but then, unfortunately, never provides a simple
19 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 264.
20 Dewey, Logic, [LW: 12] p. 343. "The opinion which is
fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is
what we mean by truth ... " Charles Santiago Sanders Peirce,
Pragmatism and Pragmaticism. Vol. V. Collected Papers. ed.
by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1931-1958), p. 268.
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definition of "warranted assertion." What he does propose is
a whole theory, a loqic intended to warrant knowledge.21
That is, by his method of inquiry, which was discussed
earli~~

in this chapter, knowledge results from "the

directed or controlled transformation of an indeterminate
situation into a determinately unified one. 11 22 But is such
"knowledge" merely propositional in that the application of
a method results in the resolution of some situation merely
to the satisfaction of the applier? One can object to such
an experiential approach on the grounds that it is still
perspectival to the user, and while it may give knowledge
that relates the individual to the truth or falsity of a
particular proposition, it tells nothing about whether
something actually is the case. Any knowledge gained is only
that of the experiencer.
However, it is essential to Dewey's thought that
knowledge must always be considered in view of the process
of reaching that knowledge. A result called "knowledge" may
be "true" or "false" in a propositional sense, but if it
does not further the process of inquiry, such knowledge
·cannot be said to have warranted assertibility. In a sense,
21 There are a few paragraphs (Logic, [LW: 12] pp. 7-8)
where Dewey expresses a preference for the words "warranted
assertibility" to "knowledge" or "belief" to express the
state of affairs in which doubt is removed as a result of
inquiry, but the passage goes on to suggest and then deny
that "truth" and "knowledge" are synonymous. This material
is not particularly useful or relevant to my purpose.
22 Dewey, Logic, [LW: 12] p. 121.
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this is the "how" of our awareness that this or that is so:
we have applied the theory.
Further, the operation must also include temporal and
physical qualities that are modified and rearranged in the
process of inquiry. Thus, the final product is a "truthbearer" in the sense that it is a statement or object
reached as the result of applying the method of inquiry in
the fullest sense of a dynamic process of "transformation."
What all this may mean requires that we must continue
to plunge forward, as Dewey develops terminology as he goes
along, and accept intuitively that his statements will be
gradually transformed into a unified whole. One might almost
say that one cannot just read and reflect on Dewey, but that
one must also "experience" him. Clearly, for Dewey the
entire process leading to warranted assertibility is both
operational and experiential.
Yet considering how to "experience" Dewey brings us
back to the question of how warranted assertibility is an
statement of how things are. If by experience we mean
immediate sensory stimulation, the account would be inadequate. However, if knowledge can only result from cognitive
rational activity, even accompanied by James' "cephalic
movement," we are no closer to a complete account. Added to
which the entire corpus of Dewey's work revolves in no small
part around his use of the term "experience."
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It is not unusual to find a philosophical concept
broken down into its components with only one of these parts
dealt with, while the rest get dumped in a box labelled
"later" or "don't fit." It is particularly tempting to deal
only with John Dewey's clearer statements because his dense
language sometimes renders a familiar philosophical component quite unrecognizable, or he jumbles together a boxful
of bits with a label that is not part of our philosophical
vocabulary. An example of this is Dewey's use of the term
"environment," by which he means not only "a field in which
observation of this or that object or event occurs," but
also "the universe of experience."23 This definition of
"environment" obviously is not a direct answer to the
question, "What is experience?" It is, however Dewey's allencompassing answer to "how things are;" that is, environment includes, and at the same time, IS, all the constituents of an experienced situation.
Now, consistent with his abhorrence of any sort of
dualism, Dewey dismisses the either/or of realism and
idealism with an appeal to a "unity of relationship" between
cognitive and empirical experience. This includes logical
relations of both abstract terms and propositions, which
must "be satisfied in the course of inquiry [in order to
formulate] the ultimate goal of inquiry in complete satisfaction of logical conditions. 11 24 That is, some logical
23 Ibid., p. 530.
24 Ibid., p. 346.
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principles are essential to the unity of relationship that
establishes the environment for both the operation of
inquiry and the goal or end-in-view of the operation.
Inquiry, then is the working relationship between facts and
ideas. This functional attribute is an operational process,
however, not a fixed static point. It is the state of growth
from antecedent reality to consequent reality, which are
really only abstractions marking off a segment of the
dynamic process of transformation.25
The process -- and the goal -- of Dewey's operation
of inquiry is "the state" of how things are. Since it is the
operation of inquiry, that is, the process of establishing a
unity of relationship, that is the warranted assertion that
such is indeed the case, warranted assertibility is another
way of stating "how things are."

Achinstein's concepts of evidence and probability
While the process of inquiry assures the procedural
means to examine the works of Dewey and of Aristotle, it is
necessary at this point to discuss the way in which the
presentation of data and warrants for such data constitute
evidence and as such are confirmation of the claim presented
in each chapter; that is, assure that the material means are

25 Gertrude Ezorsky, "Dewey: truth as warranted
assertibility" from article on Pragmatic Theory of Truth,
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, v. 6 (New York: Macmillan,
1967), pp. 428-430.
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adequate. While the nature of this work is not such that
evidence can be defined solely in the propositional form of
deductive logic, for example, even if such a process were
acceptable to Dewey's pattern of inquiry, the "aim is to
provide conditions that determine when a body of information
is evidence that some hypothesis or theory is true. 11 26 These
conditions are met in part by the use of Dewey's method that
assures

~arranted

assertibility. This would show that there

is a unity of relationship in the comparison of Dewey and
Aristotle that leads to a warranted assertion that it is
indeed the case that Dewey's 1932 Ethics are Aristotelian.
Even if such a conclusion cannot be asserted, the method
should ensure at least that the claims are "theoretically
and practically informative. 11 27
Determining the probability of the correspondence of
concepts is already difficult in terms of comparison of the
language of Dewey and of Aristotle. Further, Peter Achinstein maintains that to say that data or a warrant is
evidence that.an hypothesis is true does not mean that there
is an increase in probability of the truth of that hypothesis. Although he does not "claim that probability is
irrelevant for evidence, 11 28 Achinstein holds that standard
26 Peter Achinstein, Concepts of Evidence (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 2.
27 Ibid.
28 Achinstein, Concepts, p. 157.
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definitions of probability are inadequate and proposes what
he calla an "explanation definition."
According to this explanation definition, data or
warrants serve as potential evidence that an hypothesis is
true if and only if that evidence is true and the hypothesis
could correctly explain the evidence if the hypothesis were
true. Although Achinstein says that he does not really find
this an adequate definition, he provides nothing further
himself. However, Achinstein's explanation definition
actually does satisfy Dewey's condition for warranted
assertibility. That is, an environment is set up in which
the "problem" is in effect intrinsic to the solution, and
both are encompassed by those ideas and facts of "how things
are" in the pattern of inquiry.

Conclusion
By clarifying Dewey's pattern of inquiry with a
method by which to make claims about the hypothesis of this
dissertation, the task has been broken down into what Dewey
called "constituent distinctions and relations.n29 The
"primary and secondary material will be built up into
warrants to support the claims of each chapter. While it may
not be possible to subject these judgments to the rigors of
pro~ability

analysis, any conclusions will at least meet the

conditions of Dewey's warranted assertibility.
29 Dewey, Logic, p. 108.
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Dewey emphasizes that "in both science and common
sense, the operations of transformation, reconstruction,
control, and union of theory and practice in experimental
activity ... are analogous to those involved in moral activity."30 Now the dynamic process of growth is related to
persons, who, after all, are the agents of moral activity.
While it may not be possible to establish more than a
minimal correspondence between Aristotle and some of Dewey's
points and processes contained in the 1932 Ethics, it is in
the arena of moral activity that this inquiry will take
place. Any conclusions reached will be rather more of the
nature of similar structures of the ethics of Dewey and
Aristotle than of final absolute principles.
"Absolute principles" appear so attractive today
partly because of the continuing power of that "quest
for certainty" about which John Dewey wrote. Not that
it needed Dewey to teach us the weakness of absolutism: Aristotle himself saw that ethics contained
no essences and that there is accordingly no basis
for geometrically rigorous theories in ethics.3 1
Here is actually an instance of a case that could be made
for Dewey's Aristotelianism with regard to the topics of
absolutism and essences. Although a discussion of the
Aristotelian content of another of John Dewey's great
30 Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in Paul Arthur Schilpp, The Philosophy of John Dewey
The Library of Living Philosophers Vol. I (Evanston and
Chicago: Northwestern University Press), pp. 579-80.
31 Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of
Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), p. 341.
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works32 is beyond the scope of the present task, the above
quote from Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin is also an
example of material means found in secondary literature from
which one can infer the similar positions of Dewey and
Aristotle. Their positions on systems of ethical theory have
already been discussed briefly in a way that leads to the
implication that, in this matter at least, Dewey may be
Aristotelian.
In the following chapter, I will undertake the procedural means of examining secondary literature to determine,
first, what it is to be Aristotelian; second, what others
say about Dewey in this regard; and, finally, what Dewey
says himself about his philosophical heritage. The subsequent chapters will set out in what specific ways some
concepts Dewey presents in the 1932 Ethics are Aristotelian.
The structure and process of the method presented in this
chapter will be used to compare what Dewey says and what
Aristotle says -- and what each appear to mean by what they
say -- to determine the extent, if any, to which it can be
claimed that Dewey's 1932 Ethics is Aristotelian.
By presenting primary source evidence of the words of
both Aristotle and Dewey and drawing on support from
secondary sources, the points of each ethical structure will
be indicated, as will the processes that connect these

32 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, (New York: Minton,
Ba 1 ch , 19 2 9 ) [ LW : 4 ] .
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points. If it appears that the method of inquiry and what is
being accomplished by this method are one and the same
thing, that is indeed the case.
The particular elements of the ethics of John Dewey
that have been chosen for this dissertation as points in a
structure of Dewey's ethics are conduct and character,
virtue and reflective morality, and the teleology of human
acts. The functional or operative process of these in terms
of both the individual and society will connect the points
of the structure. What I perceive as comparable points and
functions in Aristotle also constitute a structure, which
itself can be compared to the structure of similar points
and functions in Dewey's ethics.

CHAPTER III

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE "ARISTOTELIAN''?

There are several strands to Aristotle's work that
can be said to characterize his philosophy. Randall
summarizes these as a "formalistic naturalism" or a
"structuralistic functionalism. 11 1

Aristotle's naturalism
One view of naturalism takes direct experience of the
world as its primary subject matter.2 Although there were
"naturalist" philosophers before Aristotle, they tended to
devise speculative hypotheses and theories that had little
acquaintance with empirical facts.3 Aristotle sought to
reconcile observation of nature with the practice of
dialectic, the systematic discussion of beliefs and facts
that Plato regards as the primary method of philosophical
inquiry.4 Although dialectic takes the form of question-andanswer between different persons in Plato, in Aristotle's
1 Randall, Aristotle, p.

295.

2 Ibid., p. 297.
3 Terence Irwin, Classical Thought (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 119.
4 Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, p. 7.
33
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works dialectical conversation becomes one person taking
both parts in the development of philosophical exploration.5

Aristotle's formalism
There is a certain formalism to the method of dialectic. John Dewey and others have attributed a too rigid
formalism to some of Aristotle's thought, particularly to
the application of that logic which has come down through
the scholastic tradition. However, one cannot escape the
fact that there is a formal procedure to be followed in
factorial analysis, that is, the search for factors and
structure within subject matter in order to understand these
in terms of their functioning within the context of the
subject matter.6 For example, biological taxonomy, the
method of classification, requires a formal series of steps
to final identification. Logical realism views knowledge as
a discovery of what is experienced to be there and not
merely a human invention.
Further, "what is there" exhibits the characteristics
of Aristotle's functional realism, the view that "structures
·found are always those of determinate processes, functioning
in determinate contexts. 117 This is the functionalism that
includes observable structures that have a describable and
5 Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, p. 488.
6 Randall, Aristotle, p. 297.
7 Ibid., pp. 299-300.
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often predictable "formal" way of behaving according to
their nature.
It must be remembered that Aristotle's logical and
functional realisms are two aspects of his theory that
universals exist only in the experienced world. This theory
is opposed to the Platonic idealistic theory of an unchanging and eternal world of ideal and perfect forms. On Plato's
account, reason recognizes contrasts and similarities
between the experienced world and the Realm of Ideas, and
thus identifies things. A person thereby recovers knowledge
that was forgotten when psyche became enmeshed in matter.
Aristotle's universals can be grasped by human reason
and are not dependent on Plato's Realm of Ideas. That is,
they exist independently of the mind but not independently
of the things in which they are recognized. First order
universals are apprehended a prioria and include mathematical concepts and logical constructs that, while not "experienced," nonetheless can be grasped by reason and used to
discover knowledge of the things perceived or experienced.
Aristotelian second order universals also exist independently of the mind but can be recognized in particulars,
such as two plus two equals four. In this case one can say
that universals "are to be induced by experience. 119 The use
8 Takatura Ando, Aristotle's Theory of Practical
Cognition (The Hague: Marcus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 189.
9 Ibid.
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of these tools of reason in the experienced world guarantee
a formal or structured approach to knowledge by means that
are consistent with the processes or "functional" aspect of
Aristotle's natural world.

Aristotle's structuralistic functionalism
Direct experience of the world is the primary subject
matter for Aristotle. Thus, naturalism relies on experience
and rational .methods of inquiry to discover the structure of
an organic relationship or way in which human beings
function in themselves and with their environment. A way of
looking at this has been summarized by Chambliss as:
... the ways in which human beings take action as part
of their nature. [This view of naturalism) is a
declaration of the idea that we cannot avoid making
our own social and political nature. Since to be
social is to be human, we make our own human nature.
Aristotle's naturalism stands out in the idea that
things of nature have ends .•. 10
Thus nature is a teleological system in which natural
objects, including human beings, function and interrelate as
part of an overall pattern or order that is natural both to
the individual objects and to the universe itself. For
Aristotle, the structure of nature can be grasped through
formal methods of reasoning, as well as through experience.
To do so is not to put reason in opposition to experience,
but rather each is contained within the other as the
10 J.J. Chambliss, Educational Theory as the Theory of
Conduct: From Aristotle to Dewey (Albany: State University
of New York Press), 1987. p. 23.
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experience of reasoning about nature gives meaning or reason
to the experience

Q.f.

nature.

The structure or system of the natural order for
human beings includes psychological and social as well as
biological factors, all of which function or operate in
relationship to one another so as to enable specific tasks
or activities to be accomplished. It is in this sense that
Aristotelianism can be said to be a "structuralistic
functionalism." The Aristotelian naturalist directly
experiences the world within the context of a biological,
psychological, and social structure, which can be known both
perceptually and through the use of reason. It is in this
sense that an Aristotelian can be said to be a formalistic
naturalist.

John Dewey and Greek philosophy
In order to answer the question of whether Dewey was
an Aristotelian, we cannot depend on what he said of
himself. Probably no philosopher has ever attributed to her
own position the wholehearted adoption and assimilation of
all of the characteristics of the philosophy developed by
another. As case in point, we have Aristotle who, while
accepting Plato's view that there are universals, nonetheless argued in favor of the universal inhering in a natural
order, against Plato's view of the universal as eternal
forms residing in the Realm of Ideas. So, while Platonic
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concepts can be traced in Aristotle's thought, we could not
say that Aristotle was a proponent of this aspect of Plato's
philosophical thought.
Dewey, in fact, often says how drawn he is to Plato's
writing, but approval of Plato's dialogues on the teaching
of morality, for instance,11 by no means makes Dewey's total
view of moral theory Platonic, except perhaps in the same
sense as it can be said that Aristotle was Platonic because
he agreed with Plato's belief in universals but disagreed
with the Theory of Forms.12
However, Dewey was greatly influenced by the ideas of
the Greek philosophers, and to determine the extent of this
influence we need to draw not only on what Dewey said of
himself, but also on what other persons said about him. By
way of a preliminary example, which also suggests Dewey's
position with regard to Plato's Realm of Ideas, Lewis Hahn
says that Dewey's is a pragmatic naturalism in which "not
eternal static realities or permanent substances but
qualitied events, things in time, temporal processes,
histories, or historical events, happenings are centra1. 11 13
Now, this example does not bring us very much closer to
determining if Dewey is Aristotelian, but one can suggest
11 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 163.
12 Irwin, Classical Thought, pp. 123-124.
13 Lewis E. Hahn, "Dewey's Philosophy and Philosophic
Method," in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, p. 40.
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that it may be enough to indicate that, like Aristotle,
Dewey did not agree with Plato's view of the universal.
What do others say of Dewey's relationship with Greek
philosophy? There is an enormous amount of evidence to
examine, and everyone seems to quote everyone else. I would
like to begin with what was said of Dewey after his death.
In 1958, an informal meeting of ten men who had known and
worked with John Dewey, in some cases for forty years, was
tape-recorded. Their conversation was transcribed, edited,
and published in 1959 to mark the centennial of Dewey's
birth. At the end of the evening, one of the men at the
meeting read a letter that he had presented to Dewey on his
90th birthday in 1950. Alvin Johnson was a classical Greek
scholar and political scientist, who, with John Dewey and
other educators, founded the New School for Social Research
in 1919 and retired as president emeritus in 1945. He wrote:
To John Dewey, latest of all the great Greek philosophers. But have you not been fighting the Greek
philosophers? So you have: Greek philosopher has
fought Greek philosopher since before Thales and
Heracleitus the obscure. But in one thing you, John
Qewey, and the Greeks are one. You have all fought
fe~;i •••• the blacker night of the mind, where habits,
traditions, abstractions, assumptions, prejudices,
hatreds at large, dance ... 14
Most sources seem to agree that Dewey drew on his
earlier experience of Greek philosophy less after he became
acquainted with F.J.E. Woodbridge, Johnson, and others who
14 Lamont, ed., Dialogue on John Dewey, p. 139.
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wore their classical scholarship lightly as they went about
more immediate matters in the world around them. While Dewey
did maintain in the 1908 Ethics some knee-jerk biases
against the classical tradition, these were minor compared
to the polemic enjoined against the later classical modern
tradition in the persons of Kant and Bentham.15 In the 1932
Ethics, Dewey makes frequent reference to Aristotle,
although he does not directly quote from the Nicomachean
Ethics or other works. The number of references to Aristotle's Ethics has also increased in the Literature at the end
of chapters in the 1932 edition.16
John Anton, in particular, points out that Dewey had
a genuine affinity to Aristotle, which his "students saw
more clearly than Dewey ever realized, or perhaps was
willing to admit. 11 17 John Herman Randall, who was one of
Dewey's students and later his colleague at Columbia
University, has probably proposed the most relevant
connections between Aristotle and Dewey. From this connection that others saw, although is was never acknowledged
directly by Dewey, it could reasonably be inferred that
15 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, see Ch. 13 and 14, pp. 235-284.
16 From only three books mentioned in the 1908 Ethics,
Dewey has increased the Literature references in the 1932
Ethics to include Aristotle's entire Nicomachean Ethics.
17 John P. Anton, "John Dewey and Ancient Philosophies," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (1965},
p. 485.
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Dewey continued to study Aristotle over the long years of
ongoing intellectual growth and development.

Dewey and Hegel
Occasionally, it is suggested that Dewey is in some
way a "Hegelian," in part through the influence of one of
his early mentors at Johns Hopkins, George Sylvester Morris,
who maintained that Hegel and Aristotle were in essential
agreement.18 ·Harris had studied in Germany under Friedrich
A. Trendelenburg who had concluded that "the organic
operation of the natural world argues to the existence of a
guiding intelligence. 11 19 Morris then came under the influence of the British neo-Hegelian, Thomas H. Green, who,
Dewey says, argues "that the only conceivable world •... is a
single, permanent, and all-inclusive system of relations, 11 20
that is bonded by "a permanent, single consciousness. 11 21 It
must be noted that Morris had rejected Trendelenburg's
Aristotelian naturalism, yet it seems that that was the very
thing Dewey was later to develop in his own philosophy. In
the same way, Dewey picked up on Green's "system of relations," but gives no more hint of any religious or other
18 Ibid.
19 Neil Coughlan, Young John Dewey (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 22.
20 Dewey, [EW: 3], p. 20.
21 Ibid., p. 22.
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conviction of supernatural guidance or control of the
natural world than Aristotle does.
Hahn, however, makes the point that although Dewey
acknowledged his debt to Hegel, Dewey also believed that his
critics had exaggerated his indebtedness, as Hahn says:
•.. because they had not paid due regard to the
context or situation in which he used certain terms,
and that, in any event, objective idealism does not
have a monopoly on the interpretation of such words
as 'whole, complete, coherence, integration,' and
presumably 'interrelated unity' or 'interdependence'. 22
Dewey himself says:
There was a period extending into my earlier years at
Chicago when, in connection with a seminar on Hegel's
Logic I tried reinterpreting his categories in terms
of "readjustment" and "reconstruction." Gradually I
came to realize that what the principles actually
stood for could be better understood and stated when
completely emancipated from Hegelian garb.23
During the early years of World War I, Dewey's
attitude toward Hegel in particular changed even more as he
attributed to German philosophy the rise of Prussian
militarism.24 "It is customary to call (Hegel] an Idealist.
In one sense .•. he is the greatest realist known to philosophy. He might be called a Brutalist. 11 25 At this time, too,
22 Hahn, "Dewey's Philosophy and Philosophic Method,"
in Guide to the Works, pp. 24-25.
23 Jane M. Dewey, ed., "Biography of John Dewey,"
Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey, pp. 17-18.
24 Max H. Fisch, "Dewey's Critical and Historical
Studies," in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, p. 320.
25 Dewey, German Philosoohv and Politics (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1915), p. 107; [MW: 8] p. 191.
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Dewey changed his attitude on American non-involvement and
began to support American entry in the European war.
In the 1908 Ethics, Dewey makes three references to
Hegel by way of example of a type of moral theory in which
"both the good and the law of the individual are placed on a
strictly institutional basis."26 However, his discussion of
the nature of moral theory in the 1932 Ethics does not
contain these quotations, neither is there further any
reference to Hegel in the body of this text.27

One must

conclude that, by 1932, Dewey really had no further need of
or use for Hegel.

Dewey's naturalism
Dewey's naturalism, like Aristotle's, involves direct
experience of the world. However, our human nature is also
experienced as we are engaged in interrelationships that
involve much more than just our human experience of the
world. In effect this view of the nature of human relationships suggests that our sum of human experiences contributes
as a part of the sum of all experiences of humanity, that in
c--· .' ;<.

26 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 208.
27 There are two end of chapter Literature references
at p. 157, Ritchie, Darwin and Hegel, 1893, and p. 81,
Hegel, Philosophy of History, 1881, the latter also appears
in Checklist of References, p. 502, along with Hegel,
Philosophy of Right, 1896, but I can't find reference to
this last anywhere in the text.
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turn can be recognized as part of our individual experience.
But we must be aware that:
••. experience is Qt as well as in nature. It is not
experience which is experienced, but nature ... Things
interacting in certain ways ~ experience: they are
what is experienced.28
This is a naturalism that involves the individual in
interaction with the natural and the social world, for on
Dewey's account these cannot be separated. Nor is the
involvement of the individual with the world separate from
that which it is the nature of the human person to be.
Dewey's 1932 view of the individual as being by
nature involved in the total environment represents a change
in his thinking. His earlier position that the individual
merely affected and was affected by the environment drew on
limited psychological ethics in "terms of inner-individual
processes ... Now, however ... there is a direct focus on the
full complexity of natural and social relations ... 11 29

Dewey's formalism
Direct experience of the world includes a temporal
.development that leads to knowledge. By undertaking any
inquiry a person is engaged in that sorting and ordering of

28 Dewey, Experience and Nature rev.ed. (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1929), p. 4a: [LW: 1] p. 12.
2 9 Abraham Edel and Elizabeth Flower, Introduction,
1932 Ethics, p. xxvi.
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the material means of experience that utilize the formal
procedural means of the process of inquiry .
••. knowledge implies judgement (and hence thinking)
... [and] such terms as 'thinking,' ·reflection,' and
'judgement' denote inquiries or the results of
inquiry, and [further] inquiry occupies an intermediate and mediating place in the development of an
experience.30
We saw that Dewey's pattern of inquiry does have a formal,
procedural process of treating the material means, the
subject matter of experience. Through scientific inquiry, we
discover and come to understand "the distinctive features of
nature and how experience is one type of natural transaction. 1131

Dewey's structuralistic functionalism
Once again, it is another of Dewey's innumerable
definitions of "experience" as "the interaction of organism
and environment, resulting in some adaptation which secures
utilization of the latter, 11 32 that describes the func~ional
aspect of his thought. His naturalism thus involves dynamic

30 Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1916), p. 1; [MW: 10] p. 320.
31 Richard J. Bernstein, John Dewey (New York:
Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 79.
32 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Henry
Holt, 1920), p. 87; [MW: 12] p. 129.
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functions of "interactions or trans actions of varying
durations and extents"33
There is a diverse structure to these functions on
three levels. Hahn commenting on Dewey describes these as:
1) the physico-chemical level of mass-energy interactions, the level on which the physical sciences seek
to discover the properties and relations of things in
terms of which they may serve as means or instrumentalities, 2) the psychophysical or organic pattern of
need-demand-satisfaction activities, and 3) the level
of mind or human experience in which social transactions and meaning come in. Matter, life, and mind
accordingly are not separate and distinct kinds of
Being but rather different modes of interconnection
and operation •.. 34
Development of Dewey's thought
Dewey has not been helpful to us who try to deal with
his philosophy. Not only is his writing dense, but it is
also particularly difficult to read, as Dewey attempts to
construct a vocabulary to express his thought. This vocabulary was in lifelong process of change and refinement, but
Dewey rarely drew attention to the instances where he was
using earlier concepts as part of newer concepts expressed
with different terms. Thus the "reflex arc" as a concept of
the response of reason to the data of experience lost its
simple connotation of behavioralist cause and effect and
became subsumed into "rational morality" in the 1932 Ethics,
and, without much clarification, into the "matrix of
33 Hahn, "Dewey's Philosophy and Philosophic Method,"
Guide.to the Works, p. 42.
34 Ib'd
1 •

'

pp. 42 -4 3 •
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inquiry" in the I,,oqic, which now included not only psychological thought responses to stimulii, but also biological
and social elements, all operating in relation to one
another. But Dewey never alludes to this development of his
thought, much less spells out the incorporation of his
earlier concept into a larger whole.
Dewey was well aware, however, that his need to
express his philosophy in what he hoped was common,
understandable language was problematic. He even considered
changing the title of Experience and Nature to culture and
Nature in a revised edition because of his:
•.. growing realization that the historical obstacles
which prevented understanding of my use of "experience" are~ for all practical purposes, insurmountable •.. 3
Even when he seemed to be making a clear statement, Dewey's
words are open to misinterpretation. For instance, one of
the few reviews of the 1932 Ethics places Dewey in the ranks
of universalistic or consequentialist utilitarianism.36
While it is true that Dewey has a great deal to say about
utilitarianism, the reviewer failed to notice that such
attention was for the purpose of setting up Dewey's
rejection of either a utilitarian or deontological basis for
'

35 Dewey, quoted in Textual Commentary, Experience and
Nature, (LW: 1] p. 361.
36 Frank Chapman Sharp, book review in International
Journal of Ethics 44 (1933-34), p. 159.
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a complete •oral theory in favor of one that provides
"principles which are truly relevant in our own day."37

conclusion
Dewey's article, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A
Rejoinder," concludes with a general remark to his critics,
with a reference to Dr. Randall, that he considers some
criticisms to be "negotiable differences, matters of degree
rather than of central principles. 11 38

While it is not clear

to which of Randall's specific criticisms Dewey is referring, much of this article is an attempt to clarify some
misconceptions arising from his "admitted lack of clearness
in [his] previous writing. 11 39 The general tenor of Randall's
remarks had been to accuse Dewey of being some sort of
crypto-neothomist, while at the same time entreating him to
unveil himself as "he who of all thinkers can today best
claim to be the representative of Aristotelian thought ... 11 40
We have seen and will see again that Randall has an
extravagant view of John Dewey as heir to, if not reincarnation of, Aristotle. Be that as it may, Randall provides us
37 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 283.
38 Dewey, in Schlipp, ed. The Philosophy of John Dewey,
p. 606.

39 Ibid.
40 John Herman Randall, "Dewey's Interpretation of the
History of Philosophy," in Schlipp, ed., The Philosophy of
John Dewey, p. 102.
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with an_ argument for the commonality of ideas between Dewey
and Aristotle can begin; for he says that:
... Dewey himself seems to be working primarily with
the conceptions of Aristotle. In his naturalism, his
plur-alism, his logical and social empiricism, his
realism, his natural teleology ... above all, in his
thoroughgoing functionalism, his Aristotelian
translation of all the problems of matter and form
into a functional context--to say nothing of his
basic social and ethical concepts--in countless vital
matters he is nearer to the Stagirite than to any
other philosopher.41
Part of our task is to see the extent to which Randall may
be correct in his evaluation. The factor of naturalism as a
functional structuralism that can be examined by formal
means has been established as characteristic of Aristotelianism, and also is characteristic of John Dewey's
philosophy in a way that Platonism and Hegelianism are not.
It remains to examine more specific aspects of both Dewey's
and Aristotle's ethics.
An

additional point is the teleology or end of the

ethics of either Dewey or Aristotle. The aspects covered in
the next three chapters -- conduct and character, virtue,
and the social role of the human person, are in fact, endsin-view in Dewey's terms. They also are parts of the
structures of each philosopher's ethics revealed in these
chapters. It is these structures that may give us an
indication of some ultimate end or telos that will be
discussed in the final chapter.

41 Ibid., p. 101.

CHAPTER IV

ETHICS AS CONDUCT OR CHARACTER

While the way in which persons behave is of concern
to society, the sort of person that behaves in a particular
way seems to be of less concern. That is, as long as we
conduct ourselves in a way consistent with what society
expects of us, the sort of character we have seems to be of
lesser importance. However, for both Dewey and Aristotle it
is the character of the person that informs his conduct.
Further, it is through learning appropriate conduct
that a person's character is formed. Habit plays a role in
this development of character. So does a reasoned understanding of why one sort of conduct is more appropriate than
another. As Aristotle says, "actions should express correct
reason. 111 Therefore, character is as important as conquct.
Neither Dewey nor Aristotle provides us with a system
of how one ought to behave, much less a set of rules to
guide such behavior. Yet both of them base their ethics on
what can be observed to be experienced and what experiences
guide and motivate conduct. For both philosophers, the roles
of habit and of practice are fundamental to conduct, while,

1 Aristotle,

HE, 1103b33.
50

51

as we shall see, the type of conduct in which an individual
engages seems to be a factor of the character of that
individual. Further, it is clear that the development of
certain conduct begins in the very young and is part of the
experience of education, both in the family and in the
schools. This chapter examines the relationship of character
and conduct as points in the structure of ethics and begins
with an example of the process by which these elements are
developed in one elementary school.2 The reason for using
this anecdotal material is because it shows the process
through which character development takes place, first by
following rules imposed with an intention to habituate and
then by adopting rules that arise from consideration of the
best possible conduct.
The new principal made it very clear that she
intended to be as much involved with the children and with
the teachers as with the running of the school. One small
interdiction was on teachers' taking coffee to their
classrooms. "It is not safe to carry hot beverages in the
corridors where children are present," she said. on the
first rainy schoolday, while attempting to drive their
offspring to the school door across the playground where
busses were offloading and many children were on foot,

2 Shirley Buchanan of Sauk Elementary School, where the
principal is Lynn Badgley, Ph.D., Richton Park, Matteson,
Illinois, provided the anecdotal material in this chapter
during several delightful telephone conversations.
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parents were surprised to meet the new principal setting up
a barrier, "It is not safe to have cars in the playground
when the children are arriving," she said. As each class
arrived at the lunchroom on the first day, the principal
addressed them. "There are nine rules in the lunchroom. You
will learn three each day.• She proceeded to tell the
children the first three, had the class repeat them, and
asked, "How many lunchroom rules are there altogether'?"
"Nine!" came the chorus of little voices. On the second day,
she lined the children up and taught them the next three
rules. On the third day, the principal had each class file
to their places in the lunchroom and sit down before she had
them repeat the first six rules. Then she gave them the last
three, "Don't trade food, don't go to another table to chat,
chew with your mouth closed."
In the first two instances, the principal was setting
up some standards of behavior for teachers and parents based
on an appeal to the general principle of concern for the
safety of children at school. In the third instance, she was
setting up standards of acceptable behavior for the children
in the lunchroom, but did not appeal to any general principle. The children were being taught rules of conduct. The
adults, too, were in effect being given "rules," but their
conduct would be based upon their reasoned acceptance of the
rule as an appropriate way to ensure the safety of the
children.
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Dewey says that the initial motivation of any conduct
is interest.3 The involvement of the principal in the dayto-day activity aroused the interest of all parties. She
also knew what Dewey said was " ••• the difficulty of maintaining an idea, in keeping attention alert and continuous. 114 With

the children, repetition leading to "habitu-

ation" of the children in rule-following was appropriate,
for the principal knew that children " ... live by appetite,
and the desire for what is pleasant is found more in them
than in anyone else. If, then, [the child ..• ] is not
obedient and subordinate to its rulers, it will go far
astray. 115 It is necessary to instruct the young in correct
conduct.
An appeal to general principles can be made only to
those to "whom habituation to existing moral traditions is
actually taught. 116 This seems to suggest that all conduct
has a moral element, but what that ethical dimension might
be has to be learned. As interest leads to impulse and
desire, conduct then stands in "relation to thought, or as
3 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 290. Although Dewey has
earlier (pp. 256-57) defined "interest" by the three
characteristics "wholehearted," "persistent," and "impartial," he seems to be using the word in a more conventional
sense here.
4 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 190.
5 Aristotle, tm, 1119b6-8.
6 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 163.
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an~

of an object to be attained,"7 the safety of the

children in the school.

Morality of the human act
In response to the question of the extent to which
conduct can be said to be "moral," Aquinas claims that some
actions, such as walking in a field or picking up a straw,
are "indifferent."8 One could object that even if there are
such actions devoid of any moral element, they can take
place only in utter social isolation. In any other circumstance there must surely be a moral element to human
conduct, even if it is still not clear just how any conduct
may be said to be "moral."
Clearly, moral action in some way has to be "social"
even if it is not "public." That is, human activity, even
some actions that might never be performed in public, has a
"human" element, that is, such activity is common to the
nature of all human persons. Without yet considering what
"moral" actually means, it appears that "moral" activity is
synonymous with "human" activity.
In society it is easier to determine what is moral by
ascertaining what is appropriate to the group than to rely
on individual judgment. Edward Westermarck maintains that
conduct includes both individual and group action as
7 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 191.
8 Aquinas, ST I-II 18.9.
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activities adhering to custom or law. He defines customs as
public habits that in the strictest sense involve rules
based on society's ideas of conduct and that must demonstrate two characteristics, habitualness and obligatoriness.
Therefore, not every public habit is a custom.9 If an action
is not obligatory or binding in some way, it is merely a
habit that upon reflection will disclose no underlying moral
considerations. Thus, some conduct may indeed be morally
indifferent at least with regard to the expectations of
society, even if it has some underlying consideration on the
part of the individual.

Customary morality
Is it possible that, even if morality does not inhere
in all individual acts, society in some way provides an
ethos in which all action has a moral dimension? In a
primitive society, custom may be the sole rule for conduct,
but not every member of a group need share the moral ideas
upon which a custom is based even if all may "aver to the
custom. 11 10 A more sophisticated society codifies customs as
rules of conduct and enforces these laws as a means of
social control, as Westermarck says, both from considerations of social utility and from a sense of justice. Laws
9 Edward Westermarck, The Origin and Development of the
Moral Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1912), p. 159.
10 Westermarck, p. 161.
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may express the moral ideas of acceptable conduct held by
most or all members of a society or may, unlike a custom,
"express the ideas, or simply the will, of a few, or even of
a single individual"ll sovereign and impose control on the
members of a society. Thus, there is also a possibility of
bad law that might not even be overcome by a Hobbesian
concept that the will of the commonweal was sufficient to
enact good laws for the commonweal.
That law can be considered "bad" or "good" demonstrates the fact of a moral dimension to all social action
as conduct based on custom. Thus every social act may be
said to be in accordance (or conflict) with rules based on
ideas of morality that deal with public and overt acts.
What does this moral dimension to the social act mean
for the individual person? If conduct is a social expression
of moral ideas, what would bring an individual to act in
accordance with or against the custom or law of a society?
Dewey makes the distinction between "customary" and "reflective" morality.
The former places the standards and rules of conduct
in ancestral habit; the latter appeals to conscience, reason, or to some principle which includes
thought.12
While, in our opening example, the subsequent conduct of
parents and teachers might well be habitual response to
11 Ibid., p. 167.
12 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 162.

CHAPTER V

IS DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF VIRTUE ARISTOTELIAN?

Dewey makes a distinction between natural goods that
appeal to immediate interest and desire and "moral good,
that which is approved after reflection. 11 1 This distinction
is one that demonstrates the role of reflective morality in
ethics. That is, conduct which has its basis in reflective
morality is characteristic of the person who can make the
determination of actions that may be said to be "good," for
both that individual and society. This aspect of character
is called "virtue" and is found in the structures of the
ethics of both Aristotle and Dewey. By examining the concept
of virtue in each philosopher's work it is possible to claim
that Dewey's view is Aristotelian.
A concept of virtue as goodness dates from preHomeric times in Greece. Aristotle developed the view that
virtue was not so much the heroic state of being "good at,"
but rather being good for its own sake. In the Christian era
ways of "being good" were enumerated until the whole
catalogue of virtues fell into disuse. Virtue as an essential point attained by a specific process in the ethical

1 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 207.
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structure was lost -- or discarded as religious apparatus
not appropriate to philosophical discourse.
Dewey, however, considers the virtues important
traits of good character in much the same way that Aristotle
did. On Dewey's view "a list of virtues •.. cannot be given a
fixed meaning, because each expresses an interest in objects
and institutions which are changing."2 Similarly, Aristotle
presents the virtues not as a fixed list of behaviors but
rather as the different "states of character [that] should
be formed and coordinated for the virtuous person's benefit.113 That is, the "virtue" of any individual may differ
from that of any other person as much as persons may differ
in physical characteristics or in social environments.
Although each philosopher considers the "cardinal" virtues
of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom, such specific
characteristic do not make a person virtuous, but rather the
person's character is the expression of the virtue of the
person. The virtuous person is one who has a balance of all
the virtues to whatever degree necessary to live and
participate in society.
After presenting an enormous amount of historical,
ethical, and philosophical thought in Ethics and the Limits

2 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 255.
3 Irwin, Classical Thought, p. 136.
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of Philosophy,4 the contemporary British philosopher Bernard
Williams concludes that Socrates' question, "How should one
live?" is nowhere closer to being answered than when it was
first asked. As Williams looks at the enterprise of philosophy and how its various parts are related to that part
called ethics, he suggests, first, that in this century all
historical perspective has been lost and, second, analytic
philosophy in particular has given us patterns of process
that makes much of what is called "ethical theory" a cold
rather than hedonistic -- calculus. I will try to show that
this is not true of John Dewey, who has not only followed
the lead of Aristotle -- a most historical figure -- but has
also warmly enhanced Aristotle's classical ethical concept
of virtue.
Both Aristotle and Dewey had quite clear visions of
"how one should live," and for each of them, their life as
individuals was one in which they each considered the entire
philosophical enterprise as both the reason for life and the
goal. What they have shared with us is obviously not a
blueprint for behavior. Rather, each philosopher's ethical
"writing is a powerful exposition of the underlying universal
principles of

~

humankind behaves.

John Dewey also does consider modern ethical traditions, but clearly maintains that neither utilitarianism nor

4 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985).
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deontoloqism alone is an adequate guide to how one should
live. 5 Theory is not useful on a day-to-day basis except
when one has the time to consider it.
For what is called moral theory is but a more
conscious and systematic raising of the question
which occupies the mind of anyone ••• in the face of
moral conflict 6
What is needed is not a guide to how a person should live
but rather a guide to what sort of person one is, should be,
and can become. For Dewey this is a process consistent with
his concept of conduct being informed by character which in
turn informs conduct. That element of character as process
as well as manifest in action is virtue.

Virtue in moral theory
The theory, if it can be called such, that persons'
good conduct is based on their character, is called in contemporary moral philosophy, "virtue ethics." While deontologists and utilitarians proliferate in abundant and
fractional variety, most proponents of virtue theory seem to
agree that the virtuous person would readily use the tools
provided by other moral philosophies yet adhere rigidly to
none of them. This appears to be what Dewey proposes. While
Dewey has not actually proposed some sort of "virtue
ethics," his "reflective morality" specifically requires
5 See also "Three Independent Factors in Morals," [LW:
5 ] pp • 2 7 8 - 2 8 8 •
6 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 164.
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human conduct modified and enhanced by the response of
others, to take a direction Dewey calls "virtuous."
The basis of virtue ethics is found in the classical
Greek tradition of Plato and Aristotle. Although Dewey has
in his writings expressed his pleasure at reading Plato, he
makes no such reference to Aristotle. This is not surprising
as, unlike Plato's Republic, the Nicomachean Ethics was not
composed_ as a text but reads like what it is, a set of
lecture notes and outlines probably compiled by Aristotle's
students -- not particularly pleasurable reading. Dewey also
may have been highly antipathetic to some late nineteenth
century interpretations of Aristotle? and chose not to deal
with any such concerns while collaborating on an ethics
textbook. However, it is clearly upon Aristotle's account of
virtue that Dewey draws for his share of the 1908 Ethics.a
Dewey is still consistent with Aristotle in his
account of virtue in the 1932 Ethics. Abraham Edel and
Elizabeth Flower say, in their introduction to the 1932
Ethics, that Dewey's ethical theory has undergone con7 Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History
of His Development, Richard Robinson, trans. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1948). The issue appears to be the primacy
of contemplation of God over against eudaemonia in Aristotle. One could also speculate Dewey was not yet far
enough removed from his nee-Hegelian background (see Chapter
III) to consider Aristotle on his own merits.
8 The references to Plato are mainly contained in the
chapters written by James Tufts in both the 1908 and the
1932 editions. The concept of "wisdom" referred to later in
this chapter is clearly not a Platonic view.
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siderable revision, which is, in fact, reflected in the
later account of the role of virtue in morality. There is a
continuity to Dewey's account of virtue in this edition that
can be shown to be similar to Aristotle's account of virtue.
This continuity is reflected in the expanded references
Dewey gives to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.9
If Dewey's account of virtue is derived from Aristotle's, in some respects it may be said to be both more
psychological and social than Aristotle's account.10 For
instance_, Aristotle distinguishes between virtues of
character that promote the person's happiness and moral
virtues that promote the good of others. Dewey makes no such
distinction. Virtue for him is integrity of character -whole, persistent, impartial interest, and thus always in
relation to the person's total environment.11 Yet Aristotle
does bring his two notions of virtue together when he says
that virtue of character as a whole is the same state of
character as general justice, "complete virtue to the
highest degree because it is the complete exercise of
complete virtue. 11 12 And so too for Dewey, virtue as "com9 The 1908 Ethics gives only Books II, III, and IV of
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as references, whereas
references to every book appear in the 1932 Ethics.
10 While I do not address this here, Dewey's section on
generosity in the 1908 Ethics shows a Yankee spareness when
compared to the spectrum of Aristotle's first four chapters
of Book IV (1119b22-1125b27).
11 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 257.
12 Aristotle, NE, 1030a30.
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plete interest is the only way in which justice can be
assured."13 In this, Dewey's view is certainly Aristotelian.
In the next chapter we will see Aristotle's description of "virtue in action." It remains to be seen if Dewey
provides for us in the late twentieth century a fuller
explanation of the social nature of virtue than Aristotle.
While what he says may be Aristotelian, the way in
which Dewey says it is not. Dewey does not use much of the
comm.on vocabulary agreed upon by scholars of Aristotle, and
when he uses particular words of his own choosing, the
meaning frequently slips and slides in context. I have tried
to draw parallels with only the most clear concepts but
sometimes have found that, the fuller the account, the
muzzier the details became. This phenomenon will be seen in
Chapter VI, which focusses on the social part of Dewey's
account, Part III of the 1932 Ethics, in which there are no
references to Aristotle. The rest of this chapter will deal
with virtue in Dewey's account of habituation in moral
conduct as well as with Aristotle's phronesis as the
operating principle of moral conduct. That is Dewey's
reflective morality is a process that has been fully
described by Aristotle, although Dewey does not call our
attention to the resemblence.

13 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 259.

76
Acquiring virtue
In the 1908 Ethics, Dewey had defined virtue as
"habits of character whose effect is to sustain and spread
the rational or common good."14 As we saw in Chapter III,
these habits of conduct arise from natural capacities or
interest deliberately encouraged, whether through specific
instruction or through the practical assigning of value as
rules. Both Aristotle and Dewey deny that virtue is in any
way innate, although the disposition to virtue is part of
the "good" of human nature. Natural capacities or dispositions, Aristotle says, "arise in us by nature ... we did not
acquire them, but already had them •.• [V]irtues, by
contrast, we acquire •.. 11 15 as habits of character. How,
then, does habituation of an individual sustain and spread
the rational and common good?
For Aristotle, the highest goal for the person as a
citizen is, after all, the practice of politics. He says
that the role of a legislator is to make citizens good by
habituating them, and thus "[the right] habituation is what
makes the difference between a good political system and a
·bad one.nl6 Or as Dewey says, " ••. society esteems and
respects those attributes of an agent which tend to its own
peace and welfare.nl7
14 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 358.
15 Aristotle, NE, 1103a27-33.
16 Aristotle, NE, 1003b4-6.
17 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 360.
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Further, society's esteem and approval are essential
to the process of habituation. That is to say, if the
practice of virtue can be said to be the art of making
choices well, we need to learn how to make good choices, to
become habituated in choosing well. Choice is a basic
element of human action. At the simplest level we choose or
don't choose. Luckily, most babies come with the fundamental
preference or choice for eating. A built-in mechanism,
crying, may at first only signal undifferentiated discomfort, but the organism quickly develops a range of choices
to convey to caregivers. Humans need other humans to provide
availability of choice and to give meaning to some of the
choices made. And it is through choices made that persons
actually reveal and become the sort of self or moral agent
they are. 18
The choices we make result from many factors:
temperament, a disposition to act, environment or psychological conditioning, or even part of the genetic package.
Common sense tells us this is so, that persons have these
attributes as part of what makes a person who they are,
recognizable as this individual and not any other. The
conglomerate of these attributes is what we call a person's
character and what some of us call our self. But Dewey
reminds us:

18 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 287.
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Selfhood or character is •.. not a mere means, an
external instrument, of attaining certain ends.
It is an agency of accomplishing consequences.19
That is, there is some end-in-view to conduct, but a further
end to which character contributes.
Further, we are engaged in a lifelong process. A
child's choices are developed through experience and
instruction. Parents indicate by approval or disapproval
whether a child has made an appropriate choice. Dewey says,
society "instructs the individual as to the consequences of
his act. 11 20 He also reminds us that we "must look behind the
current valuation to the real value. Mere conformity to
custom [should not be) conceived to be virtue. 11 21

Virtue as practices
This concept of the value or good of conduct, as
being more than that which is approved by society, is
consistent with what Macintyre calls "practices." A practice
on his account is any coherent human activity through which
goods internal to that particular activity are realized with
the result that human powers to achieve excellence and human
conceptions of the ends and goals involved are systematically extended. In this Aristotelian sense, not all human
activities are considered practices. For example, an
19 Ibid.
2 0 Ibid.
21 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 361.
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activity may be aimless, that is without a specific end or
goal. Some activities merely result in an external good,
such as money or status, and as such may be interchangeable
with any other similar activity with similar reward. In
fact, most human activities do have goods "externally and
contingently attached ••• by the accidents of •.. circumstances," but Macintyre's point is that,
"(T]here are always alternative ways for achieving
such goods, and their achievement is never to be had
only by engaging in some particular kind of practice. 1122
It is the undertaking of the particular practice, then, that
yields internal goods. Thus, in Dewey's terms, current
valuation, including conformity to custom, is analogous to
external goods: real value is only to be found in internal
goods. Practices as social phenomena will be discussed in
the next chapter.
In Aristotle's discussion of virtue, he also defines
goods as external and internal. Then of internal goods he
distinguishes between intrinsic goods and useful goods.
Useful goods are those that may be directed to a specific
end. We may use many of these goods to achieve a rational
plan that in itself may be a useful good ••. or to reach an
intrinsic good, that is, something to be pursued for its own
worth and value. As Dewey says, the end-in-view may become
the means to yet some further end. While for Aristotle the
22 Alisdair Macintyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame,
Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 251-252.
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only thing ultimately worth pursuing appears the intrinsic
primary good eudaemonia, good-spiritedness, or "happiness:"
Dewey uses "identification of an agent's capacity with some
aspect of the reasonable or common happiness," in yet
another definition of virtue.23 Thus, there again is
agreement that happiness in the broadest sense is some sort
of principal good. It still must be made clear what role
virtue plays in the enterprise.

Virtue defined
Happiness is not virtue; nor is it g virtue. On
Aristotle's account, it is the ultimate end of all human
actions, and, since all actions are attempts to achieve this
end, it follows that all of our choices and actions can be
said to be means to that end. Virtues are qualities,
character traits, choice making processes, and principles
that enable us to perform acts that are more likely to help
us to achieve the primary good, happiness. Thus a good
choice is a virtuous choice, or as Thomas Aquinas says:
••• of those who are good and best in virtuous
living, only those are illustrious and happy who
actually perform good deeds. Hence it is better to
say that happiness is a virtuous operation than
virtue itself .24

23 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 362.
24 Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics,
Vol. I, L.XII: C 153, p. 65.
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Just as we found more than one sense of the word
"choice" in action or conduct, so "virtue" may be used in
different ways. Sometimes the terms choice and virtue are
interchangeable. For instance, the "choice" to be courageous
can also be described as an exercise of the "virtue" of
courage. Thus, "a virtue" may be the name for a quality of
human character. It may also be the quality of some end-inview or immediate goal, or it may be the quality of the
execution of a plan itself: while at the same time the goal
and the execution are often inseparable in the human act.
That is, though useful goods may be used to achieve a plan,
it is the intrinsic good of the plan itself from its
conception through the excellence of execution that is to be
rationally aimed at and achieved. Once again, here are two
different senses of "virtue," as intrinsic good and as
useful good. Which is to be preferred? For Aristotle,
" ••• it matters quite a bit whether we suppose that
the best good consists in possessing or in using,
i.e. in a state or in an activity that actualizes
that state. 11 25
Dewey again defines virtue, this time as an attitude
of interest. This for me triggers an image of a dog poised,
paw up, head and back and tail forming a straight pointer to
the quarry. But Dewey's "aspects of virtue" as interest
summarized in both editions of the Ethics 26 appear to
25 Aristotle, NE, 1098b25.
26 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, pp. 363-64; 1932 Ethics, pp.
256-57.

82

constitute a state rather than an activity. That is,
wholehearted, persistent, and impartial interest are all
needed to achieve an end, even if it should turn out to be
the means to yet another end.
For example, self-esteem or a sense of self worth is
not just a quality that enhances activity. Nor is it merely
a "process and becoming," as Aristotle would put it. It is a
state from which one carries out one's intentions, one's
plans. John Rawls describes self-esteem as that which gives
us the assurance to undertake a plan with the "secure
conviction" that it is worth carrying out, " ..• [and] a
confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's
power, to fulfill one's intentions. 11 27
It seems then that such "ability" may be not just
either useful or intrinsic, but rather both/and. So generosity or temperance may not be virtues only as names for
qualities of human character, but also are essential to an
operation leading to happiness. But are virtues turned off
and on for appropriate occasions? Could "happiness" be the
only "virtue" after all? What happened to justice, which was
discussed earlier in this chapter? Apparently virtue must be
"grown into." For instance, Aristotle. distinguishes between
"natural" and "full" virtue.
For each of us seems to possess his type of character
to some extent by nature, since we are just, brave,
27 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 440.
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prone to temperance, or have some other feature
immediately from birth. However we still search for
some other conditions as full goodness .•. for these
natural states belong to children and to beasts as
well [as to adults], but with out understanding ... 28
It appears that virtue is a state, but all the
activities in which persons engage may be simply what
Aristotle would say are the natural virtues exercised.
These seem then to be consistent only with what Dewey calls
"customary morality. 11 29 However, some other condition is
needed for full virtue, even when particular virtues are not
"in operation," as it were. Aquinas calls it prudence and
names it as the general principle of operation for moral or
full virtue, that is, understanding or rationality.30
Dewey has a name for it, too. He says, in the 1908
Ethics, "Wisdom, or (in modern phrase) conscientiousness, is
the nurse of all the virtues. 11 31 For the Greeks, wisdom is
the highest of the virtues and Aristotle distinguishes
between sophia, wisdom concerned purely with study and the
processes of thought, and phronesis, most usually translated
as intelligence or prudence, both of which are misleading,
alas, for the current meaning of the former is often limited
to mental capacity and agility and the latter to over28 Aristotle, NE, 1144b.
29 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 255.
30 Aquinas, CNE, Vol. I, L.XI: C1280, p. 602.
31 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 364.
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cautious narrow-mindedness, or. as Dewey says, "a kind of
sublimated egoism."32
So Dewey offers the word "conscientiousness" and
while ignoring its possible misinterpretation as punctilious
attention to the dictates of conscience, defines it as the
intelligent or deliberate character at the heart of a
voluntary act. In his early work, Dewey began to describe
what was to become his concept of conscientiousness in the
character of the individual as that "habit of judging moral
situations ..• (as] the key to the direction and to the
remaking of all other habits. 11 33

Process of reflective morality
In Chapter IV we saw how reflective morality leads to
making moral choices and seeking moral ends-in-view.
Aristotle emphasizes the role of reason in character of the
act as well as of the individual in another description of
virtue as:
not merely the state expressing correct reason,
but .•• the state involving correct reason ... and it is
intelligence that is correct reason in this area .•. We
cannot be fully good without intelligence or intelligent without virtue of character.34
What then is this intelligence or "prudence " without which
we cannot be fully good .•. or be said to have full virtue? It
32 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 258.
33 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 375.
34 Aristotle, NE, 1145a5.
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is a process with three stages and levels and steps within
the second stage. Phronesis begins with what Aristotle calls
"good" deliberation over one's own eudamonia or state. Such
deliberation leads to the second stage, forming a supposition, and the first of two levels of decision-making,
prohairesis. The steps within this level include identifying
the rational desire, calculating about how best to achieve
it, and actually making the decision to go ahead. The second
level, praxis, involves acting on the decision made about
the supposition, with the steps of forming an intentional,
voluntary desire to act, undertaking the act, and completing
the entire activity. This brings us to the third stage of
phronesis, which is to once again engage in deliberation.
Thus, phronesis or prudence is an ongoing reflective
process that at the second stage may lead to decision that
may in turn lead to action. I would suggest that it is this
second stage where Dewey's "problem-solving" takes place as
a stage in reflective morality. If a supposition is formed,
it may or may not be identified as a problem, need calculations of how to act or not to act upon it, and require a
decision to go ahead or not. These steps are a process
complete in itself within the larger process and may lead
either on to praxis or back to the third stage. This is not
an endless repetition however, but more of a reconstruction,
with an end-in-view at each level, as in Dewey's reflective
morality.
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In the same way as in phronesis, the process
operating in reflective morality is not exclusively
rational, for it depends on the material of experience for
the evaluation of courses of action, skill of execution or
techne of the action, and the ongoing evaluation of both the
process and the arrival at the end-in-view, which is a point
at which the process can begin again.

Conclusion
In the 1932 edition, Dewey wrote an entire chapter in
which "moral judgment is the general principle of operation
for reflective morality. 11 35 The operation, like Aristotle's,
is one of moral deliberation and valuation, initially based,
as we have seen, on choice and the moral development of the
self. While perhaps not as refined, this is in several ways
consistent with Aristotle's phronesis.

And although Dewey's

effort to render reflective morality into social action is
less than satisfactory, it may be appropriate to consider
that Aristotle never attempted such a thing. However,
Dewey's exposition of the person in the process of reflective morality may be rooted in the social context to a
greater extent than Aristotle. His deeper insight that our
conduct is informed by our awareness of others makes virtue
in the individual more dependent on society. Nonetheless,

35 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, Chapter 14, "Moral Judgment and
Knowledge," pp. 263-284.
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both Aristotle and Dewey have attempted the resolution of
the contrast between "man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-hecould-be-i f-he-real i zed-his-essential-nature." 36

36 Macintyre, p. 52.

CHAPTER VI

ETHICS IN SOCIETY

There is some way in which persons continually relate
to one another that initiates, sustains, and furthers such
relationship. As we will see in this chapter, Aristotle
calls thls bond of relationship philia, often translated as
friendship. Dewey does not have an account of friendship as
such in his part of the 1932 Ethics, but his discussion of
what it is that binds persons together in society, particularly in brief references to that which Dewey calls love,
can be shown to be remarkably similar to Aristotle's philia.
The claim of this chapter is that Dewey and Aristotle are
saying the same thing.

Society and the individual
Up to this point the discussion has focussed on the
individual rather than on the group. Although ethics and
ethical behavior are manifest in society, it has been more
important to determine whether Dewey's account of ethics in
the individual person is Aristotelian. We have seen that the
human act of reflective morality includes the element of
virtue in both the character of an agent and of the conduct
and consequences of action. We also have seen that such
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moral reasoning both on Dewey's and on Aristotle's account
has a social function rather than merely the formal,
rational systematization of rules for the individual. Or as
Dewey says:
The genuinely moral person is one, then, in whom the
habit of regarding all capacities and habits of self
from the social standpoint is formed and active.l
This gives some indication of the role of the individual in
society. What is the role of society for the person? One
role of society is that it establishes norms of conduct, but
these, by and large, are on the level of customary morality.
Society also functions in the role of educating its members,
as well as the milieu in which human experience take place.

Society as educator
The community undertakes the role of educating its
members. Whether this education takes place in the family or
a tutorial or an institutional setting, the goal is to
convey those skills considered necessary in a particular
society. N.A. Lawrence says that on the level of elementary
education:
There seems no real quarrel between Aristotle's
notion of education as disciplined cultivation of the
intellect and Dewey's notion of education as
development of skills through motivated experience ... 2
1 Dewey, 1908 Ethics, p. 271.
2 Nathaniel A. Lawrence, "Aristotle: Education as SelfRealization," in Robert S.Brumbaugh and Nathaniel A.
Lawrence, Philosophers on Education: Six Essays on Founda-
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Both Aristotle and Dewey, however, consider all of the
institutions of society to be educative, not just the
schools. A.bout this Dewey says:
In the sense in which culture signifies nurture of
powers of growth and increased fullness of the life
of the mind, the ulterior function of all definite
modes of organization, political and otherwise, is
cultural.3
Insofar as inculturation is synonymous with education, the
goal is for the individual to take part in society as a
reasoning and understanding member. To do so, persons must
first develop the capacity to conduct their own lives and
then become involved in the life of the group.
This group that we call society Aristotle called the
polis. Ethics involves the capacity to conduct one's own
life well. Engaging in the good conduct of society Aristotle
calls politics •
•.. the one that, more than any other, is the ruling
science ••. it is the one that prescribes which of the
(other] sciences ought to be studied in cities •.. even
the most honoured capacities, e.g. generalship~
household management and rhetoric, are subordinate to
it. Further (politics] uses the other sciences concerned with action, and moreover legislates what must
be done and what avoided.4
R.S. Brumbaugh points out that for the Greeks "effective community membership is a necessary condition for selftions of Western Thought (Lanham, Maryland: University
Press of America, 1968, reprinted 1986), p. 73.
3 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 364.
4 Aristotle, NE, 1094a25-1094b7.
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realization ••• and in much the same way Dewey sees selfrealization as an essentially social process." 5
Individuals are interdependent .•. [While] independence
of character and judgment is to be prized ..• [it] does
not signify separateness; it is something to be
displayed in relation to others •.• the human being is
an individual because of and in relations with
others.6
Society as a milieu
One vital function of society is that it provides a
milieu in which we can engage in activities or practices
that on Macintyre's account have goods internal to them.
Practices must meet two criteria. First, the practice must
be specific in kind, and second, the practice can only be
known by the actual experiencing of it. Thus membership in
an institution such as the American Medical Association
specifies only the practice of being a member, which
although such membership can be experienced by attending
meetings and reading the journal, is neither the specific
practice of the healing arts, nor can it ever be experienced
as such. In the same way, our citizenship is nominal or an
external good unless and until we actually exercise our
constitutional franchise, specifically through the experience of voting.

5 Robert s. Brumbaugh, "Rousseau: Emile, A Romance of
Education," in Philosophers on Education: Six Essays, p. 92.
6 Dewey, 1932 Ethics~ p. 227.
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The second criterion of a practice is that it must
specifically aim to ensure standards of excellence. Clearly
the AMA does propose such standards but in fact does not
have the means of enforcing them because the actual practice
is the healing arts and it is by membership in the medical
profession, not the AMA, that the internal good of excellence can be realized.
Not every human activity experienced as a "practice
with internal goods and standards of excellence"? involves
joining some organization. There are other human activities
that involve qualities such as compassion and loyalty and
courage that are essential to human practices. These are the
virtues that Macintyre defines as:
... an acquired human quality the possession and
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those
goods which are internal to practices and the lack of
which effectively prevents us from achieving any such
goods.a
So it is through the exercise of virtue that the moral
development of the individual that is essential to the moral
development of society takes place. It is this "social
virtue" that attaches to the institution, not merely to the
elements that enable the practices of the person.
Further, although practices are essential to human
institutions, there is a mutual interdependence between the
institution and its members. For instance, institutions may
7 Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 253.
8 Ibid.
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need to be concerned with external goods that are required
to sustain the practices of which the institution is the
bearer. As Macintyre says:
[I]ndeed so intimate is the relationship of practices
to institutions ••• that [they] characteristically form
a single causal order in which the ideals and
creativity of the practice is always vulnerable .•. and
the essential function of the virtues •.. justice,
courage, and truthfulness ... [enables practices to]
resist the corrupting power of institutions.9
Dewey was well aware that there are some aspects of modern
technological society that have made it almost impossible to
achieve human excellence. As early as 1916 he said that:
Aristotle was certainly right when he said that "any
occupation or art or study deserves to be called
mechanical if it renders the body or soul or
intellect of free persons unfit for the exercise and
practice of excellence. 11 10
Dewey also understood the Greek view of what constituted a
free person. "Because Greek industry was so largely .••
[based] on servile labor, all industrial activity was
regarded by Greek thought as a mere means •.. " Thus, the
persons engaged in such labor could not enjoy a truly human
and rational life. However, Dewey accepts that Aristotle has
drawn "a just conclusion from the assumed premises, [that]
there are classes of men who are necessary materials of
society but who are not integral parts of it. 11 11
9 Ibid., p. 256.
10 Dewey, Democracy and Education, [MW: 9] p. 264.
11 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 369 [LW: 1] p. 277.
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What then enables persons successfully to engage in
practices? How do individuals function together in society?
What binds them?
Some virtues or qualities of character such as
courage or truthfulness have been named as necessary to
achieving excellence in practices, which necessarily are
social activities. Justice results from the successful
achievement of excellence in virtue of character and of
conduct. Justice is, as it were, a "social" virtue,
recognized by others who experience what Tufts calls "an
impulse toward a life in common. 11 12 Here Tufts uses the
Greek word philia as that "which expresses itself in
friendship," But then immediately refers to "a unity of
disposition and purpose (homonoia) ... which may be called
"political friendship 111 13
Although Tufts also quotes Aristotle on friendship in
his chapter on marriage and the family in Part III,14
Dewey's only reference to friendship15 is a discussion of
Epicureanism as a philosophy that holds that "(p)rivate
12 Tufts, 1932 Ethics, p. 113.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 450.
15 Dewey does include friendship with "books ... [and]
the fostering of esthetic delights" among those pleasures
"more likely to give rise to future occasions of enjoyment"
in this same discussion of Epicureanism as a "doctrine which
will always flourish ••. when social conditions are troubled
and harsh," but this comment adds nothing to the matter at
hand. 1932 Ethics, pp. 200-202.
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friendship is better than public life."16 Before we can
discover if Dewey offers a view of the relationships that
can bind individuals in society, it is necessary to examine
Aristotle's notion of friendship.

Aristotle on friendship
While virtuous practice in one's own affairs is good,
it is only in relation to others and in association that the
virtue of justice is practiced. Aristotle defines justice as
"complete virtue," or:
•.. virtue to the highest degree ... because the person
who has justice is able to exercise virtue in
relation to another, not only in what concerns
himself •.. but in what relates to another.17
One might argue that the act of exercising the virtue of
justice in relation to another could be called friendship.
While such an act could be said to be done by a person
exercising the virtue of friendliness, Aristotle's concept
of friendship is so large that to call it simply a

vi~tue

character is not sufficient. In the first place it can not
be extended toward inanimate objects as can, for example,
the virtue of courage. Rather, it is the virtue that is
involved in all interpersonal relations of which Aristotle
distinguishes three types: good, pleasant, and useful.ls
16 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 114.
17 Aristotle, NE, 1129b30.
18 Aristotle, NE, 1156a3.
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It is not possible here to consider all of Aristotle' a different perspectives on friendship. Rather the
focus must be on the social, the community as the highest
form of friendship in the domain of the political. Here
association may be pleasant, if the persons involved are
acquainted with one another, but for Aristotle, personal
relations of intimacy whether of family or friends are not
essential to community. It is possible to have useful
relations such as business association in which the parties
concerned may not even know one another, but this is not the
highest form of friendship in the polis.
Political friendship must extend beyond a circle of
immediate friends, but it must also involve more than an
attitude of goodwill toward other members of the community.
For the primary concern of justice is the good of the
political community (1129b17-19); and if rational
agents have good reason to be concerned about the
good of the political community, they have good
reason to extend their altruistic concern in the
particular direction that leads to justice and to the
choice of just action for its own sake.19
So concern for the good by good persons with good reason for
good action is served by friendship in the community.
Another way to put this is to say that the ethos of the
community is one of friendship in that all of the members
are engaged in ethical conduct for its own sake. Recalling
that Dewey does not directly address the topic of friendship
in his Ethics but that the word for friendship in Greek is
19 Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, 215.
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philia, which can also be translated as love, we can turn to
see what Dewey has to say on this matter.
Dewey's view of ethics in society
In his discussion of virtue, Dewey argues that
individual virtues cannot be taken in isolation, not should
they be treated as other than phases of "an interpenetrated
whole •.. the positive harmony characteristic of integrated
interest. 11 20 He uses the term "love" to define such an
attitude of interest. He names the virtues of courage and
wisdom as essential to the realization of:
... such a complete interest [that is] the only way in
which justice can be assured. For it includes as part
of itself an impartial concern for all conditions
which affect the common welfare, be they specific
acts, laws, economic arran~ements, political
institutions, or whatever. 1
Dewey is using interest or love in the same way as Aristotle
in using friendship with regard to the community. Such love
is not just what is good for the person or merely pleasant.
Nor is Dewey treating simply personal relations or relations
of utility.
At the end of his final chapter in the 1932 Ethics,
Dewey writes of "social unity," and defines it as "interest
in the affairs of the community as if they were one's own
concern," and he further says "love of country is intrinsically extension of love for one's friends and neigh20 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 258.
21 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 259.
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bors.n22 Dewey's view of a global community of nations is
clearly much more than Aristotle ever envisaged. However, I
would maintain that in his very restraint in the use of what
he would consider overly emotional language, in his use of
the word love only with regard to morality in society, that
Dewey is very near to Aristotle's view of that which binds
persons in community.

22 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 368.

CHAPI'ER VII

DEWEY'S AND ARISTOTLE'S TELEOLOGY

This chapter will look at the end or telos of Dewey's
and Aristotle's ethics. We have seen that ethical conduct
and character can be described in terms of virtue in the
individual. The relationship of persons in society can be
described in terms of philia or friendship or love. Dewey's
reflective morality functions in the same way as Aristotle's
practical wisdom, or phronesis, enabling a person to make
good choices and choosing the good. Society, or the polis,
provides the necessary social environment where all this
takes place. What is the end of all this? Is there some
final or ultimate good toward which ethics leads us?
Dewey says that the question of what ends a man
should live for is only meaningful in a reflective morality,
"[t]he question of what ends a man should live for does not
arise as a general problem in customary morality. 11 1 What
this means in effect is that the end of customary morality
is that it should be observed. Reflective morality requires
something more, however, that is, goals and behavior
consistent with:

1 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 184.
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The development of inclusive and enduring aims is
the necessary condition of the application of
reflection in conduct; indeed they are two names for
the same fact.2
Thus the ends of reflective morality and the process itself
are one on Dewey's account.
Reflective morality in Aristotle's terms is virtuous
conduct expressed in an individual through a character that
has been formed through habit and education. The aim of
practical wisdom or reflection in conduct is arete or
excellence in the practice of ethics and politics. The word
eudaimonos can be used as an adjective to describe such good
practices; that is, excellence of character and conduct has
both for the person and for society the inclusive and
enduring aim or goal of well-being or eudaimonia. Before we
can discuss whether eudaimonia can be seen in some way as an
ultimate end, however, it is necessary to look at how a
person moves toward the recognition or the understanding of
human action and experience in order to develop any such end
or goal.

Aristotle's archai and logoi
It is through dialectical reflection on experience
that we become aware of the archai, the reasons "why" things
are as they are. Those reasons derive from the logoi or
meanings that are generated by sensory perceptions and go to

2 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 185.
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make up what we recognize as an experience. It is upon these
experiences that we engage in the process of dialectic to
discover universals by induction, that is, to account for
the underlying concepts or principles implicit in the
particular instances. "When the observation of particular
instances is often repeated, the universal that is in them
becomes plain. 11 3 The archai, then, are the underlying
concepts or the basis of recognizing, understanding, and
learning the logos or meaning of future experiences.
It can be shown that for Dewey a similar structure
and function are contained in the concept of reconstruction
of experience. It remains to be seen if this is a useful
basis for Dewey's teleology. That is, does Dewey also have
some ultimate end, such as eudaimonia, reached by a process
that is similar to Aristotle's?

Dewey's reconstruction of experience
One could say that the meaning of reconstruction of
experience is contained in the juxtaposition of the words
rather than in the individual words themselves, that is, the
dynamic or functional relationship of the words reflects the
dynamic meaning of the expression. It is, however, possible
to analyze some meanings of the word "reconstruction" and
its relationship to the word "experience" in order to show

3 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, BkII, 19: lOOaS,
100b4, 5.
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that, while not interchangeable, the meaning of each word
and its underlying concept depends on the other for complete
understanding.
As an underlying concept, or arche, reconstruction as
remodelling (or building again) generally is done with
intention of some improvement in the original structure, to
make it better or more efficient. If we are discussing human
persons or groups, one such intention or aim of reconstruction, then, could be "social efficiency," which Dewey
defines as

11

•••

the cultivation of power to join freely and

fully in shared or common activities. 11 4
The problem with this definition of reconstruction is
that it seems to require the participation of more than one
individual for the actual manifestation. Can reconstruction
be only a group activity? Surely the individual can engage
in the enterprise on his or her own? The definition of
reconstruction as social efficiency gives us a clue, in that
it tacitly indicates that it may not be the group that is
"reconstructing" but the individual who cultivates some
means of participating in the group. The person, then, is
engaged in the experience of reconstruction.
Why then are common or group activities needed at
all? From Dewey's perspective it may be that the group
provides some necessary element for the enterprise. That is,

4 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, (MW: 9] p. 123.
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that only in shared or common activity can experience take
place that is the material of reconstruction.
One might object that a person can have "experience"
completely alone. This would be true, however, only if such
experience excluded any reference to prior experience or
knowledge or memory that at whatever remove would necessarily involve contact with an other. That is, all that we are
aware of_ involves experience of other persons. Further, it
is only by experiencing "the other" that we develop an
awareness of our "self."
In a extended discussion of the self, George Herbert
Mead suggests that the commonality of experience of events
exists only in the spatial-temporal world each individual
experiences through the consciousness that is unique to
human beings. That is, neither the location nor the duration
of an experience will ever be the same for any two individuals. We can nonetheless deal with our subjective worlds,
anticipating and planning eventualities, and engage in all
forms of social conduct through the functioning of both
"self and the mind. 11 5
However, a person's awareness of self depends on
awareness of others. It is clear that for Mead a person is a
social animal who must experience a group and the attitude

5 George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Present
(Chicago, London: Open Court Publishing Company, 1932), ed.
Arthur E. Murphy; Lectures upon the Paul Carus Foundation,
Third Series, plus supplementary essays. p. 178.
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of others before she can experience herself. This does not
necessarily mean that exposure to great numbers of other
people is necessary before a sense of self can develop. In
his discussion of developmental play, Mead is particularly
clear that the imitative acts of role-playing are the selfstimulation of the responses of a limited other, that is,
the person's own experience limits how the "other" can
respond. As play becomes a game with rules and structure,
roles are formalized and the person must become aware of all
of these in order to participate fully, even when the
activity is solitary or, as we say, takes place in the
person's imagination. The person develops a sense of the
"generalized other" that enables him to play a role himself
and also to anticipate the actions of other players, even if
they are not present.6 Mead has given us a view of an early
stage of what Dewey calls reconstruction of experience. Now
we need to look at where all this takes place -- where the
real "others" are -- in society.

Reconstruction of experience and social reality
The experience of reconstruction increases the
ability of the self to undertake subsequent experience
through practice and experiment. It is through experience of
both self and others that an individual develops what Alfred

6 Ibid., p. 186.
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Schutz calls organized knowledge of "social reality."7 It is
possible to acquire this knowledge because, as we have seen,
to be social is to be intersubjective; that is we can share
experiences and those experiences are meaningful to us and
to others in that we are able to recognize and grasp others'
actions, motives, and goals. Thus, "our common sense
knowledge of everyday life"S enables us to describe and name
some experienced attributes of social reality.
First, Schutz says, our lives are "structurally
socialized" in that if we change places with any other
person we will experience substantially the same perspective
as the other. This reciprocity of perspectives makes it
possible to place ourselves "in another's position" to
examine the particular instance. The examination of the
immediate experience enables us to enhance both our experience of self and of others as the reconstruction of the
"material of experience" proceeds.
Second, the greater part of our knowledge, its
content and forms, is genetically socialized, derived from
past experience and approved in institutionalized forms,
such as Dewey's customary morality.

The individual can

choose to accept, examine, change or reject the content,
7 Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers I: The Problem of
Social Reality, ed. and intro. by Maurice Natanson with
preface by H.L. Van Breda (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1962), p.

53.

8 Ibid., p. 55.
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thus enabling the reconstruction process. By identifying
some of the basic meaning of experience, at least one
discovers those things that are biologically and physically
determined.
Finally, although knowledge actually may vary between
individuals, this variety is accepted as being an appropriate distribution that somehow levels off and no one is
concerned that everyone does not know everything that
everyone else knows. This social distribution between
individuals makes it possible to universalize "common
knowledge." Reconstruction of individuals' experiences in a
group situation must draw on the acceptance of this commonality to reach consensus, for example.
As we keep in mind these attributes of social reality
Schutz offers as the logoi that make up the "material of
experience," it is possible to recognize the archai of many
of our experiences and thus advance the enterprise of
reconstruction. But what is the end of all this? Is reconstruction of social reality in some sense the goal?
If so, the group or shared activity, actual or in
memory or imagination, is essential for the experience of
reconstruction, but this is not the word order of our
original expression. Although we have shown there is some
relationship that may even be called a dynamic interdependence between the terms, what then is "reconstruction of
experience"?
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We may return to the definition of social efficiency
for the answer. The expression "reconstruction of experience" refers to a "power," a mode of human action whether
by disposition, habituation, or virtuous intention, that can
be cultivated and that enables the individual to join
"freely and fully" in ••• what? There is always a threat of
circularity in Dewey, and at this point it seems that
reconstruction of experience leads to more of the same ad
infinitum. But we have already seen in Chapter II that
Dewey's many definitions of the word "experience" often have
this apparent circularity. Perhaps we need to ask, Is there
a further purpose or end to "reconstruction of experience"
that is contained in, but not limited to, definition?
Dewey clearly intends there to be an end that could
be described as something like the realization of the self
both leading to and resulting from participation in society.
"Reconstruction of experience" is the shorthand expression
of how this may be achieved. It is not an end in itself, but
is descriptive of a dynamic process or activity that leads
toward an end. Nor is reconstruction of experience intended
just to be the means to an end. Once again, there is an
element of both/and, in the same way as Dewey says that:
The self is not a mere means to producing consequences because the consequences, when of a moral
kind, enter into the formation of the self and the
self enters into them.9

9 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 286.
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Somehow the reconstruction of experience functions as an
ongoing process with a structure that can change and grow as
the process proceeds. As the meanings of experience are
recognized, these become the basis for the continuation of
the process, the archai underlying the further recognition
of logos, in Aristotle's terms.

Is reconstruction of experience teleological?
Before one can say whether reconstruction of
experience is teleological, on must define both the
predicate and the subject of the statement. That which is
teleological has some end or goal or purpose. A teleological
ethics, for example, looks to the end result of an act,
whereas a deontological ethics looks to the extent to which
a moral principle of obligation, such as duty or promisekeeping, requires that the act be performed. Teleological
explanation is in terms of some end that may or may not lead
to a further end. These are not ends in a causal sense, that
is, landing in the parking lot does not "cause" the cat to
be dropped out the window. Nor are ends just functional, as
excretion is a function of the kidney, because that function
is part of the function of the entire organism.
Ends also must be goal-directed or purposive, whether
in the short term as means to yet another end or as an end
that is, in ethical terms, some "good" in itself, such as
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knowledge or self-fulfillment, or some balance of "better"
good over "lesser" good.
Dewey's best simple definition of reconstruction of
experience is the " ••. reorganization of experience which
adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases
ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.nlO
This reorganization is purposive, an intelligent direction
and redirection of action to an end. It also involves
innumerable short term "ends-in-view" leading to a unity of
purpose or rational integration of the person in his
environment as yet another and further end of reconstruction
of experience.
So ends-in-view lead to some further end of reconstruction of experience. Dewey writes about the structure of
experience as "three deepening levels or three expanding
spheres of context." The first level is the direct personal
experience of the thinker. The second is social or anthropological world we call "culture." The third level is the
philosophical context of "the boundless multiplicity of the
concrete experiences of humanity when they are dealt with
gently and humanely, [that] will naturally terminate in some
sense of the structure of any and all experience. 11 11 If such
a statement sounds like some part of a definition of
experience as an elaborate teleological structure, that is
10 Dewey, Democracy and Education,
11 [LW: 6] pp. 3-28.

[MW: 9] p. 82.
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indeed the case. In his introduction to one of the collected
works editions Sidney Hook describes Dewey's use of the term
to refer to "a pattern of events in which the organism is
deliberately or with some awareness attending or acting upon
something and undergoing or suffering the consequences of
the action."12
Thus, reconstruction of experience is teleological in
that unity of purpose as an end requires some sense or
awareness of the structure of experience leading to the
rational integration of the person in the pattern of events
of her environment as an end. These are not two ends, but
rather aspects of the end that is the dynamic ongoing
process of reconstruction by, for, and in the person. If
some ultimate end is sought, it may be for the person to be
the most that that person can be.

Ultimate ends
We have now reached the point where there must be
some ultimate end to which the practice of ethics aims. For
both Dewey and Aristotle, it seems, the end of good conduct
is human welfare. But is there some ultimate end beyond "the
functioning of man's various powers under the guidance of
intelligence," as Randall puts it?13 Dewey maintains that

12 Democracy and Education, (MW: 9] p. 10.
13 Randall, Aristotle, p. 253.
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although "we set up this and that end to be reached ... the
end is growth. 11 14

Growth as the ultimate end for Dewey
The Introduction of the 1932 Ethics discusses the
moral life in terms of growth, " •.. a process in which man
becomes more rational, more social, and finally more
mora1.nl5

It is through reconstruction of experience that

this growth·process takes place. That is, just as Dewey sees
education as reconstruction of experience, he also emphasizes "that the educative process can be identified with
growth when that is understood in terms of the active
participle, growing. 11 16 Thus, both the process and the end
of reconstruction of experience are, in fact, growth. Since
the practice of ethics involves reconstruction of experience, the end of ethics is growth.

What is the ultimate end for Aristotle?
Just as character is inseparable from conduct, so too
is ethics inseparable from politics. Although ethics is
concerned with the happiness and virtue of individuals and
politics with the best sort of society, both are concerned
14 1932 Ethics, p. 306.
15 1932 Ethics, p. 13.
16 Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1938; Collier Books, 1963), p. 36 [LW: 13] p. 19.

112
with human conduct that will bring about human good.17
Ethical and political knowledge must be intellectual as well
as practical, and its aim is to strive for the good of human
conduct .
... good deliberation is correctness that reflects
what is beneficial, about the right thing, in the
right way and at the right time ..• unconditionally
good deliberation is the sort that correctly promotes
the unconditional good (ie. the highest good]18
What Dewey would call reflective morality must be just that,
good action based on good reflection about good things. What
then is the highest good? Good conduct is "good because it
gives satisfaction to human feelings .•. a means to [individual] happiness or self-contentment ... whereas virtuous
conduct affords us happiness apart from the result."19
Clearly, the highest good is not just that which is good for
something or a means, but is that which is in some way good
in itself.
Good deliberation is good for something, obviously,
but there is still another level of deliberation. First,
unconditionally good deliberation must extend into one's
whole life, past and future, and take into consideration
one's total environment.20 Second, one must be aware of the
17 Aristotle, NE 1094b9
18 Aristotle, ~ 1142b27-30.
19 Takatura Ando, Aristotle's Theory of Practical
Cognition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 265.
20 Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, p. 338.
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good of the deliberation for its own sake.21 Finally, the
choice made as a result of the good deliberation must be
made for its own sake. That is, the person of virtuous
character chooses virtuous conduct because such conduct is
virtuous. It is in making this choice for the good that the
highest good is achieved.

Eudaimonia as the ultimate end for Aristotle
This highest good, or eudaimonia, has been variously
called happiness or well being or living well, but none of
these can give the full meaning of the function of eudaimonia in the person. That is, eudaimonia is not some static
point that is reached once and for all, an accomplishment.
Rather it is the continual act, the ongoing accomplishing
that is human nature, something for which it is our nature
to strive, and in the striving we realize our nature more
fully.
Self-realization is not the nature of the greatest
good discussed by Aristotle, however. As Edel points out:
••• ethics in the Aristotelian tradition is not a
separate province in which a freely willing moral
agent struggles within himself in a fretful effort
to do his duty or conform to a universally binding
moral law or even calculate profit and loss.22

21 Ibid., p. 341.
22 Abraham Edel, Aristotle and His Philosophy (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), p. 251.
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This rejection of individualism is, of course,_ consistent
with Dewey's view that no single contemporary moral theory
is sufficient " ••• as the injunction to each self on every
possible occasion to identify the self with a new growth
that is possible ••. n23
Can some ultimate end of growth in the moral life be
attained, however? Aristotle does deal with this question at
the end of the Nicomachean Ethics.
Although it is through the realization of our natures
as social "animals" that the human good is accomplished, we
also are, on Aristotle's view, the only animals that think.
Thinking or reasoning is necessary for practical wisdom, but
there also is a speculative reasoning that can be engaged in
for its own sake. This is sophia, wisdom that is " ... found
in the highest degree in

the activity which is concerned

with theoretical knowledge. 11 24 This is the activity of the
"self-sufficient" and wise person engaged in using the best
capacity of the human person, reason. "Hence the best
activity of all is the best activity of the best capacity, n25 and Aristotle appears to have presented us with an
ultimate end -- the use of reason, study, contemplation.

23 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 308.
24 Abraham Edel, Aristotle (New York: Dell Publishing
Co., Inc., 1962), p. 416.
25 Irwin, NE, note to 1177a14, p. 378.

115
Yet almost immediately, Aristotle says that although
this activity of study is the highest single good of all, it
still does "not contain all the goods needed to make life
lack nothing.n26 If it were the only and ultimate end we
would be as gods, which we are not. Our human nature
requires the physical and the social as well, for it is "not
self-sufficient for engaging in study; our body must be
healthy and we must have food and generally be cared for."27
Eudaimonia is the highest good of all, but is found in the
whole of human nature, man's contemplative self and his
practical self.
We learn and actively practice the "science" of
ethics as part of our participation in the "science" of
politics, the human community. The growth of the good in the
person striving for the good is inseparable from the growth
of the good in the community. Since all human life is a
process of growth it is this growth of the good in conduct
and character in the person and in society that is the
ultimate good. If this ultimate good is the end, the telos
of Aristotle's ethics, then it can be said that growth is
the end of his ethics.

26 Irwin, NE, note to 1177a27, p. 379.
27 Edel, Aristotle, p. 419.
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Conclusion
The teleology of Dewey's ethics and of Aristotle's is
the same in that both arise from human experience. Each
requires a process by which the meaning of experience is
recognized, understood, and used to continue the process.
Finally, the process itself is one of growth in morality,
the good for the person and for society, that is, in effect,
an end in itself.

CONCLUSION

It has been shown that for Dewey, as for Aristotle,
human acts include the element of virtue in both the conduct

•

and consequence of action as well as the character of the
agent. However, it is not simply that persons are virtuous
if their conduct is virtuous and the consequences of that
conduct is virtuous. That is, for each philosopher the
morality or good of the act begins with the inherent good of
human nature realized in the individual acting with full
awareness and understanding of that good in relation to
other persons. For Dewey, Neil Coughlin says, "the definition of virtue that seems eventually to have most satisfied
him was conduct that served society's end. 11 1
As a social animal we learn of the good by contact
with other humans. We become virtuous by becoming more of
the best of being human, through good habituation, inculcation in customary morality, and by using our power of
reason. Thus, like Aristotle's phronesis, Dewey's concept of
reflective morality requires the person to weigh and discard
alternatives while striving for that resolution in which the
good inheres, using the conclusion to lead into a continuation of the process.
1 Neil Coughlin, Young John Dewey (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 85.
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For both Aristotle and Dewey moral reasoning, that
is, the practice of ethics, has a social function rather
than a formal function, the systematization of rules for the
individual. Aristotle certainly does not offer a great deal
of practical guidance for actually solving moral problems
because he is:
•.• more concerned with identifying the right states
of character than with specifying the range of
actions associated with them. He thinks detailed
ethical instructions require reference to social and
political conditions, and these are discussed in the
Politics.2
In the same way, Dewey maintains that there is:
... [no) final and unquestionable knowledge on which
we can fall back in order to settle automatically
every moral problem ••. [for) this would involve
commitment to a dogmatic theory of morals.3
Dewey calls his method "experimental" in that his reflective
morality, like Aristotle's dialectic, involves the observation of particular situations.
The society in which Dewey lived was one in which
there was greater change than Aristotle could have imagined.
In consequence the demand for a truly ref lecti ve, a thoughtful, morality was never so great.
This is almost the only alternative to either
moral drifting or else to unreasoning and
dogmatic insistence upon arbitrary, formal
codes ••• 4
2 Irwin,tr., ~, p. xix.
3 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 329.
4 Dewey, 1932 Ethics, p. 233.
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The qoal is qood conduct, a good life, a qood society, for

both Dewey and Aristotle. That is, a life that is good in
itself, something worth strivinq for its own sake. To this
end reconstruction of experience is not only the means but
also the end that Dewey calls qrowth, toward which, like
Aristotle's eudaimonia, human acts are directed.
Finally, both for Dewey and for Aristotle ethics are
teleological in their orientation to both the goals of the
individual and of society. And for both the end is growth.
The points in the two structures and the processes connecting them have been identified in Aristotle and in John
Dewey's 1932 Ethics. The resulting structures are similar
enough to claim that Dewey's 1932 Ethics is Aristotelian.
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